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Bashkan elections in Gagauz Yeri 
October 2, 2002  
 
 
Bashkan elections are scheduled in Gagauz-Yeri for October 6. The electoral 
campaign is characterized by mutual suspicions of falsification. In fact the upcoming 
elections is a way of settling the conflict arisen in January. Back then, after a control 
conducted by the Court of Accounts, Gagauz Yeri Parliamentary Assembly initiated 
the procedure of ousting the incumbent Bashkan. The initiative was supported by the 
President Vladimir Voronin who accused Bashkan Dumitru Croitor of embezzlement 
and called him a thief. Gagauz administration denied the accusations and opposed the 
referenda on ousting the Bashkan, which resulted in scission of the Parliamentary 
Assembly. Later on Dumitru Croitor and Ivan Burgugji, Chief of the Protocol Section 
of the PA were investigated for obstruction to referenda. In their turn, the two claimed 
the referendum was illegal and running counter to the Republic of Moldova laws.  
 
Domestic analysts believe those political games impaired the executive branch in the 
region and thwarted some extremely important investment projects in the southern 
region of Moldova. The investigation launched against him and his supporters 
determined Bashkan Croitor to resign in the summer of this year. In its turn the 
resignation led to early elections scheduled for October 6.  
 
One may say that the Bashkan position is disputed by the Communist Party 
representative Gheorghii Tabunscic, on the one hand and another five candidates on 
the other (Stepan Topal, Ilia Stamat, Mihail Formuzal, Gheorghii Burgudji and 
Constantin Tausanji), the latter stand to some extent in opposition to the Communist 
authorities. It is believed Tabunscic counter-candidates decided to run separately in 
elections so as not to allow him to win in the first round of elections, and to join their 
forces in the second round in order to defeat Tabunscic. The same tactics was used in 
1999 when Croitor defeated Tabunscic.  
 
It is generally believed that Gheroghii Tabunscic has great chances to win the 
elections especially as he enjoys the support of the Communist Party. Gagauz 
observers report that the entire apparatus and national governmental press work for 
the electoral staff of the Communist candidate. Although Tabunscic is not a member 
of the Communist Party, in 2001 he entered the Parliament of the Republic of 
Moldova on the Communist Party list. He held the Bashkan position in 1995 - 1999. 
Tabunscic runs as an independent candidate in the current elections, although he 
enjoys the support of the governing party. Consequently, the Communist Party 
decided to allow Tabunscic to use the Communist Party electoral symbol - the 
hammer and the sickle - in his electoral campaign. President Voronin present at the 
meeting when Gheorghii Tabunscic was designated as a candidate to the Bashkan 
position highlighted the Communist Party objectives in Gagauz Yeri, namely 
Tabunscic's victory in elections in the first round. Also, the President briefed the 
Communist Party activists on the electoral tactics to be employed in order to secure 
the victory. Thus, they have to have door-to-door meeting and talk to every voter and 
convince him or her to vote for Tabunscic. It seems that the Communist activists took 
the President's advice too seriously. The representatives of Civic Initiative of Gagauz 
Yeri (coalition formed of several non-governmental organizations in the region) claim 
that Communist activists together with local government representatives started  
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collecting citizens' ID on the pretext of collecting data for a census. One may suppose 
those actions are intended to intimidate the voters and use those data to manipulate the 
voter rolls, especially as many Gagauz Yeri residents left abroad in search of a job. 
An illustration of this, is the way the meeting, when Tabunscic was designated as a 
candidate, was covered in mass media. Thus official press in Comrat, namely "Vesti 
Gagauzii" reported the event as meeting of the Communist Party activists with the 
President of the country, as a reunion held to designate Tabunscic as a candidate in 
elections. Chisinau official press reported the same very meeting as a "Forum of the 
Gagauz Yeri Civil Society". Another illustration of manipulation intentions is that 
under the decision of the Gagauz Yeri Central Electoral Commission ballots were 
printed at a private Printing House owned by the Chief of the Communist candidate 
electoral staff. Civic Initiative observers pointed that almost all electoral commissions 
have been staffed with persons loyal to the governing party or even party members. 
When there were doubts with regard to the loyalty of the poll worker the position was 
simply left vacant. The same observers claimed Communist authorities had fully used 
the so-called "administrative lever". Another illustration is the election coverage in 
mass media. Seventy percent of the airtime at the Radio and TV was granted to the 
Communist candidate, whereas the printed media provided space only for the 
Communist party program. Furthermore, delegations of high-rank Chisinau officials 
invaded Gagauz autonomy to support Tabunscic and to exercise pressure on city and 
village executive bodies.  
 
The polls indicate that from among opposition candidates Stepan Topal has the 
greatest chances to make it to the second round. Mr. Topal was the first President of 
Gagauzia (1990 - 1995), at the time the region declared its independence from the 
Republic of Moldova in 1990. It is believed Topal's great chances are due to his 
appeal to national patriotic feelings. He is always presented as the architect of the 
Gagauz Autonomy, who opposes the plans of the Communist party and its candidate 
to undermine the statehood of the autonomy.  
 
A good sign for Topal is the fact that just several days prior to elections one of the 
candidates, Ivan Burgidji, withdraw from the race in his favor. Also, Topal enjoys the 
support of the former Bashkan Dmitri Croitor. In fact according to some allegations 
the political crisis, which made Croitor resign, was staged by Gheorghii Tabunscic.  
 
Interestingly enough Topal's electoral campaign exploits the achievements of Croitor 
governing. The fact that the autonomy budget doubled during the latter's governing is 
cited. Furthermore, pensions, arrears to the wages were paid during the Croitors' 
governing. During Tabunscic's governing salaries were not paid for years, and if paid 
than with altered food. As for agriculture, Topal makes reference to the fact that 
during Croitor's governing "Pamint" project was implemented with the financial 
support of USAID, which enabled a boost of agricultural farms. Also Topal cites the 
level of processing the land during the governing of the previous two Bashkans. 
Another argument, impressive investments from Turkey, Italy and Russian made 
during Croitor governing, and new jobs created at the time when active citizens flee 
the country in search for a job.  
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Another opposition candidate, Mihail Formuzal, has great chances only in Ciadir-
Lunga, where he is the Mayor and in the nearby villages. Formuzal is believed to be 
open-minded and a good practitioner, who managed to establish a favorable 
environment for investments in Ciadir-Lunga and thus outnumber the investments in 
the capital of the Gagauz Autonomy - Comrat. The animosity existing between the 
two cities greatly decreases Formuzal's chances in elections.  
 
The chances of Ilia Stamat are also very modest. Stamat was a member of the 
Communist Party and even got in Parliament on the Communist list (1998 - 2001). He 
was excluded from the Communist faction due to the fact that in the second round of 
1999 Bashkan elections he supported Dmitri Croitor, rather than the Communist 
candidate Gheorgii Tabunscic. It is believed that Croitor appointed Stamat as the 
Head of the Foreign Economic Relations Department in appreciation of his support. 
Upon Croitor's resignation Stamat had to leave his job as well. Stamat has a pro-
Russian electoral message and a "bear" as his electoral symbol. Obviously the symbol 
comes from "Edinstvo" ruling party in Russia, so as to exploit the sympathy of the 
locals for Russia.  
 
Although known for being a good manager, Cahul Municipality Mayor, Constantin 
Tausanji, has very few chances to succeed. Local observers point that one of his 
drawbacks are the various political compromises he made during his career, which 
indicate his lack of principality in matters related to the "fate of the Gagauz People".  
Independent observers expect that election results would be falsified so as to ensure 
the victory of the Communist candidate or at least to declare elections invalid if the 
first variant is not possible. Nevertheless, Civic Initiatives managed to recruit and 
train 70 independent observers due to monitor elections in 62 polling stations. 
Furthermore, the League for the Human Rights Defence (LADO) would also monitor 
the elections with another 70 observers. Also international observers from the 
Congress of Regional Powers of the Council of Europe and OSCE would monitor the 
elections. Although the high number of observers is an encouraging news for the 
opposition candidates, it still remains to be seen if their mission would have any 
crucial impact. It is believed that electoral frauds are committed much earlier than on 
election day, i.e. by employing "the administrative lever" and intimidating the voters, 
in fact the governing party already succeeded in this. Gagauz observers believe the 
governing party would use the experience of manipulating elections in Gagauzia to 
replicate it in the general local elections scheduled for next spring.  
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Perspectives of NIS development 
October 14, 2002  
 
 
The great majority of domestic observers view as very modest not to say null the 
impact of the Community of Independent States (CIS) Summit hosted in Chisinau on 
October 6-7. On the other hand, as Summit organizers Moldovan authorities see as 
positive the impact of the event and are overoptimistic about its future. Furthermore, 
official press undertook considerable efforts to highlight the "innovatory" and even 
"savable" proposals made by the President of the Republic of Moldova, Vladimir 
Voronin, which are to have a crucial impact on the CIS future.  
 
Pessimistic forecasts voiced by domestic observers are inspired by the statistics of 
previous Summits, indicating periodically either the end of the Commonwealth or its 
revival. And there are enough grounds for this. Firstly, never there was a clear-cut 
concept on how CIS should look like, namely ideology, structure, institutions and 
activities. After the URSS Slavic founding countries (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) 
decided in 1991 to dissolve the union they launched another idea, namely to establish 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, which was to replace the URSS. The aim 
of the union was to diminish the shock soviet citizens would have upon the collapse 
of the "socialist motherland" and to preserve the economic ties between the former 
Soviet Republics, excessively centralized during soviet times. According to the 
memoirs of the former soviet high rank officials CIS was seen by the Russian 
leadership, which had the decisive contribution to the collapse of the soviet empire, as 
an intermediary short-term stage in the process of restoring the common state. An 
illustration of this is the statement made in 1993 by the most liberal Foreign Affairs 
Minister of Russia, Andrei Kozirev, reading that CIS would be a region under 
Russia's exclusive sphere of interest. The economic and political problems Russia 
created, rather intentionally, to the former Republics in order to keep them under the 
same sphere of interest is one of the methods employed to achieve the said strategy.  
 
It's easy to understand then why Russia opposed the establishment of a "free 
economic zone" within CIS, and preferred to keep the former Soviet Republics in a 
economic and infrastructure dependence to the former metropolis. An illustration of 
this is the monetary reform, secret and rapid introduction of a new Russian Ruble on 
January 1, 1992 only several weeks after the official establishment of CIS at Alma-
Ata. The move greatly hit the financial systems of the CIS member states and was 
probably intended to prove that the newly independent states wouldn't survive on their 
own and that restoration of a single state was binding.  
 
This is in short the background of CIS. If Moldovan political elite believes that a 
viable and promising structure could be based on such a foundation, one may only 
wonder what are its perspectives. Distortion of the events leading to the establishment 
of CIS won't mask its real origin. For example the argument brought up by Moldovan 
authorities that the introduction of the national currency led to the devaluation of 
citizens' deposits and that they intend to repay them within 15 years is a mere 
propaganda. It's known for a fact that the introduction of the national currency was the 
last-ditch to save the financial system of the Republic of Moldova hit by the Russian 
monetary reform. This was proven once again in 1998 when the Russian financial 
crisis seriously damaged, but didn't ruin Republic of Moldova's economy.  
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The examples cited above explain why the 1,300 documents adopted during the more 
than 60 Summits haven't been enforced so far. CIS officials do not believe that the 
Commonwealth is viable. Another argument in this respect, is the fact that none of the 
existing conflicts was settled, rather a moratorium was set on them so as to allow 
space for maneuvers to "the main strategic partner" in achieving the objectives 
highlighted in the aforesaid memories of the soviet moguls. Consequently, one may 
say CIS member states are kept together rather by the inner conflicts then by the 
vision of a common future. The recent conflict between Russia and Georgia indicates 
that the former views the rest of member states as mere hostages. The decision of the 
Georgian Parliament to leave CIS was annihilated by a simple mention of the fact that 
70% of breakaway regions Abhazia and South Osetia are citizens of Russia. Republic 
of Moldova found itself in a similar situation. Leaving CIS might intensify the 
conflicts within the member states and eventually lead to the dissolution of those 
states. That is why pro-CIS statements aren't inspired by a vision of a common future, 
but rather by the need to prevent a worse situation become a catastrophe. In this 
respect solutions are being sought and initiatives of gradual or multi-dimensional 
integration based on bilateral relations have been launched. New unions occurred 
within CIS having different or even opposite interests, namely Russia - Belarus 
Union, GUUAM, Central Asian Community, Customs Union, and Euro-Asian 
Community. Indeed, after Alma-Ata Summit Russian leadership called member states 
to define their interests in CIS so that the Commonwealth could be restructured 
accordingly. However, the disputes between Russia and Belarus, continuous 
commercial conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, tensed relations between Russia 
and Georgia prove that the pragmatism within CIS has only generated new conflicts. 
Coupled with the periodic conflicts between Moldova and Ukraine, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, and would-be conflicts between Caspian countries, one may conclude that 
the Community has very meager chances to survive.  
 
It's an illusion to believe that the "innovatory ideas" launched by the President of the 
Republic of Moldova would save the CIS. After all, CIS is deemed to have one single 
purpose, namely to remain Russia's sphere of interest. But this cannot last forever and 
there is some evidence to this. On the one hand, Central Asia countries having no 
joint borders with Russia and managed to avoid breakaway conflicts are now 
becoming increasingly independent. Thus, Turkmenia continues to ignore CIS 
Summits. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyztan allowed US military to station on their soil. 
Interestingly enough, on the eve of Chisinau Summit Uzbekistan Prezident Islam 
Karimov stated that he would allow US Forces to be stationed in the country for an 
unlimited period of time.  
 
On the other hand, NATO and EU extension, besides bringing welfare to the 
associated countries, also opens new opportunities for the citizens of neighboring CIS 
countries. That is why orientation towards EU would be very difficult to annihilate in 
the neighborhood CIS countries. EU has already launched the idea to establish a 
special neighborhood status for the following countries: Belarus, Ukraine and 
Moldova. However, it seems this is only an intermediary measure. The said countries 
themselves come to the understanding that EU enlargement would bring new 
opportunities, but also new challenges. In this respect Belarus President indicated a 
possible orientation of his country towards the West should the Russian President 
insist on the unification of the countries under federalist principles. Ukrainian 
authorities also indicated their interest in European integration. It seems that the  
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figures of Lukashenko and Cucima compromised in the eyes of the international 
community are one of the most important obstacles in promotion of a serious pro-UE 
policy. Consequently, in order to stay in power the two have to mock a pro-CIS 
option.  
 
Obviously a community run by compromised leaders do not inspire much credibility. 
Even Moldovan leadership understands this fact. On the eve of the Summit Moldovan 
President insisted on establishing a special commission responsible for EU 
integration, idea launched long-time ago by the center-right political parties. It is very 
unlikely the President would have insisted on such a structure if he had been confident 
CIS might become a viable political and economic unit. Indeed, claims made by some 
politicians that Russia might become attractive from political and military point of 
view are rather illusory. Let's just say that Russian economy represents 3% of the 
American one and equals Portuguese one, whereas military expenses equal those of 
Switzerland. Let aside serious demographic problems, it is a huge challenge for 
Russia to catch up the strongest world economies such as US, EU or China, even if it 
scores economic breakthrough. Given Russia's declared intentions of European 
integration, its claims to become a separate center of attraction would place it at the 
EU outskirts. Consequently, Russia's satellites would be deemed to be at the outskirts 
of the outskirts, even if some of them would lie between EU and Russia. Furthermore, 
Baltic States showed that breaking the ties with the metropolis might be benefic. And 
there are the Asian Republics examples tending to have a higher degree of 
independence.  
 
Given the above said, one may salute the initiative of President Voronin to reform 
CIS based on the legal framework adjusted to the EU one. This is the least CIS 
countries could get - a legal framework adjusted to the EU - after compromised 
leaders and those bearing old ideologies leave. This would aid CIS countries to 
readjust their strategic orientation based on an economic assessment and examples set 
by the neighborhood countries. If CIS countries take Voronin's recommendations 
seriously, then one may say Chisinau Summit was indeed of crucial importance. It 
remains to be seen how those initiatives will be enforced and whether the 23% 
personnel cut would contribute to it. However, Voronin's initiative bears some risks as 
well. The fact is that EU laws are based on liberal and not on communist doctrine. 
Consequently, if implemented the initiative may ruin the Communist party run by the 
President Voronin, if not it may ruin CIS. Let's see then who survives the Communist 
party or CIS?  
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Amending the Law on Political Parties 
October 21, 2002  
 
 
One of the most controversial issues related to political parties has been the minimal 
number of members required for the party registration. The issue has taken center 
stage again after Christian-Democrat deputies submitted a draft law on amending the 
Law on Political Parties providing for the increase from 5,000 to 15,000 of the 
minimum number of party members. This is the second time in the last four years the 
issue has drawn public attention. In 1998 the number of party members required for 
registration was increased 15 times, i.e. from 300 to 5,000. At that time there were 
more than 50 parties in Moldova. Immediately after 1998 parliamentary elections the 
newly established majority coalition, Alliance for Democracy and Reforms decided to 
"clean the political spectrum". The Alliance brought several arguments in favor of 
such a cleansing: "what's the use of 50 parties when only 15 of them run in elections 
and only 4 of them passed the 4% threshold of representation". Another argument was 
that the high number of political parties only confused the voters in elections and that 
small parties never learn anything from the elections they loose.  
 
After the 1998 amendment to the Law on Political Parties only 25 parties managed to 
re-register. However, the number of political parties continued to rise and as of early 
2001 there were 31 parties registered. A totally different process started one year after 
2001 early parliamentary elections, namely fusion of parties sharing similar political 
doctrines. That is why one may argue whether it is the right moment to operate 
amendments to the said law and impose drastic restrictions for parties' re-registration 
at the time voluntary mergers started. Thus, during the year the Social-Liberal and the 
Liberal Parties have consolidated. Furthermore, a merger of parties sharing social-
democratic doctrines is to be expected.  
 
One may agree that Christian Democrat's initiative is logical: they were the ones 
recommending in 2000 to raise the threshold of representation from 4% to 6%, 
whereas this year they have succeeded in introducing the successive threshold (9% for 
electoral blocs formed out of two parties and 12% for blocs formed out of three and 
more parties). Needless to say, only strong political parties may pass such a threshold.  
Even if the initiative seems logical, it is worth consulting the public opinion and 
international experience in the field. The well-known political scientist, Maurice 
Duverger believed "political parties are not organized strictly in line with democratic 
orthodoxy. Their internal structure is essentially authoritarian and oligarchic". If we 
are to consider the criticism brought to Moldovan political parties, it coincides with 
Duverger's theory. Indeed, a series of political parties underwent scissions or even 
succumbed because of the authoritarian methods employed by their leaders and the 
lack of transparency in decision making. Under those circumstances, raising the 
number of members required for party registration to 15,000 bears some risks; namely 
only several political parties would survive. Facing no competition at all on their 
spectrum surviving parties might yield to corruption. And there are enough grounds 
for such fears. To mention just the steady decrease in the voter turnout, meaning that 
the offers made by the incumbent political parties do not meet their expectations. An 
illustration of this is the election results in Gagauz Yeri. In this respect it is a great 
mistake to believe that the electorate of the political parties failing to re-register, 
would take part in elections. Consequently, in order to be consistent Christian- 
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Democrats would have to recommend abolishing the 50% voter turnout required for 
election validation too. That was the case of Ukraine.  
 
Noteworthy, a study conducted by the European Center for Free Elections and 
Democracy shows that regardless of the population size the minimum number of 
members required for party registration should be around 3,000 in order to achieve an 
adequate party system. At the same time, in the Republic of Moldova the minimum 
number of party members is not indicator of the party capacity to influence the voters. 
Thus, on the eve of 1998 elections the Agrarian Democratic Party declared they had 
60,000 members, as did the Christian Democratic Union. The former was cast 63,000 
votes and the latter 8,000. On the other hand, the Communist Party, which claimed 
only 12,000 members, was cast 800,000 votes in 2001 parliamentary elections. 
Furthermore, signature collection for the party registration might turn into a huge 
political scandal, as was the last summer case of signature collection and 
authentication for initiating a referendum on changing the electoral system. This 
would be even more complicated on the eve of upcoming 2003 local elections.  
 
Indeed a favorable environment boosting the formation of new parties should be 
established, at the same time new mechanism should be created for dissolution of the 
parties failing to gain voter's votes during several electoral campaigns. The formation 
of new viable parties would be impossible, if such barriers are raised. It is practically 
impossible to convince 15,000 citizens right at the beginning to enter the party. Only 
after registration, once the party acquires a legal status and a good team it may start 
promoting its political offer among potential voters and sponsors. From this 
perspective, the minimum number of members required for party registration should 
be decided based on the party capacity to fill the party structures with competent 
people able to ensure its viability.  
 
In fact, this is already happening in the Republic of Moldova. After the collapse of 
center-right parties in the 2001 parliamentary elections, a group of young intellectuals 
founded the Social Liberal Party, thus providing a new alternative to the center-right 
voters. It is to early to judge on the success of the new party, however the fact that it 
has become a center of attraction for youth and other parties wishing to adhere 
inspires some optimism. Indeed, the existence of 15,000 members requirement would 
have definitely discouraged the party leaders to venture in politics. As for the 
numerous parties incapable of succeeding within several electoral campaigns, they 
might be dissolved. This is the case of Mexico, where the parties failing to gather 2% 
of the votes during two electoral campaigns are dissolved.  
 
In the well-established democratic countries there are no restrictions with regard to 
party registration. However there are restrictions with regard to participation in 
elections. In the Central and Eastern Europe, let's say in Romania and Russia laws 
provide for a minimum number of 10,000 members for the party registration. 
However, Romanian population is five times the Moldovan one, whereas Russia's is 
35 times the Moldovan one. In Bulgaria, for instance parties are registered provided 
they include 51 members. Kazakhstan legislation is the strictest one, requiring for at 
least 50,000 members for the party registration. Kazakhstan population is three times 
the Moldova one. If Christian-Democrats amendments are approved then the ratio 
population number / numbers of party members required for registration in Moldova 
shall equal the Kazakhstan one. This would be a questionable performance indeed.  
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Theoretical benchmarks of the Moldovan communists 
October 28, 2002  
 
 
At the V Plenary of the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova hosted in May, 
an idea was voiced to amend the governing program approved exactly a year ago, 
within several months of the Communist' victory in early parliamentary elections of 
February 2001. The Communist press has responded to the call by launching public 
debates on the theoretical benchmarks such an amendment should be based upon.  
 
Noteworthy, although the idea to modify the bylaws was launched by the President of 
the Country and Party Chairperson, Vladimir Voronin, personalities unknown to the 
general public of the second or even third layer of the party hierarchy are the ones 
debating on the theoretical approach. The fact could be explained by the huge 
discrepancies between the declarations and policies promoted by the party elite and 
the Marxist principles shared by the lower level party members. For instance last year, 
during the Plenary the party leadership was accused of promoting a revisionist policy. 
And there are certain grounds to such accusations. Firstly, during the President 
inauguration ceremony, Vladimir Voronin stated that "society division into classes 
should be ended". Secondly, he also made a series of liberal declarations especially 
with regard to economic development. And finally, the governmental press quoted 
President as saying he would neither build Communism, nor socialism.  
 
All the aforesaid runs counter to the Marxist-Leninist principles provided in the 
Communist's governing program, which makes its revision a must. Indeed, 
Communists' inclination towards program revision is not a result of changes in their 
beliefs, but rather a constraint to promote an opportunistic policy conforming to the 
domestic and foreign political context. Firstly, Communist leaders acknowledged that 
being in opposition they failed to comprehend the changes happening in the recent 
decade in Moldova and worldwide, rather they exploited citizens' nostalgic attitudes. 
Secondly, as a result of the non-stop protest rallies Moldova ended under close 
monitoring of the Council of Europe. Thirdly, Communist movements in the former 
Soviet Republics, especially in Russia and Ukraine, suffered a huge loss during the 
last year, thus tempering nostalgic attitudes towards the revival of the communist 
movement in the former Soviet republics. And last but not least, Republic of 
Moldova's dependence on the credits provided by international financial 
organizations, forced the governing party to adopt an economic policy coordinated 
with those institutions.  
 
That is why the debates launched in the Communist press are aimed to influence the 
party political course in view of keeping it within the doctrinaire limits. Indeed the 
middle and the most indoctrinated and conservative wing of the party gets its 
inspiration from Lenin's works, especially from "What is to be done?". The 
conclusion reached by Lenin in that work is that "leading role in fighting for the 
workers' rights could be assumed only by a party endowed with advanced theory". 
The said conclusion was based on Engels' theory about the three forms of fight: 
economic, political and theoretical; as well as on Marx's believes that theoretical 
principles may not be auctioned for achieving practical goals. Currently, one may say 
party elite totally ignores theoretical approach, whereas the policy it promotes is an 
opportunistic one.  
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The middle wing faces some difficulties in applying Leninist principles to modern 
realities. As 100 years ago, (when "What should be done?" was written) there was a 
working class in Russia, as well as an "advanced theory", i.e. the Marxist one. The 
latter two determined Lenin to establish the Bolshevik party so as to seize the power 
in the interests of the working class, and later on in order to edify a Communist 
society. On the other hand, totally different things happen in Moldova nowadays. 
There is a Communist Party in power opting for the same Marxist-Leninist values and 
for building Communism. However the party theoreticians acknowledge their failure 
to grasp the class structure of the modern Moldovan society. Also, the working class, 
which they are supposed to represent, has disappeared. Consequently, Communists 
cannot decide whose interests to represent. After two years of governing, Moldovan 
Communists are still optimistic that the working class would reemerge one day. The 
example they cite in this respect is pretty annoying, namely "Topaz" factory whose 
shares have been recently sold by the Communists to a private venture, began to hire 
workers. The examples leads us to the conclusion that Communist authorities would 
use privatization of the state property to stir a contradiction between the labor and 
capital, so as to be able justify their existence as defenders of the exploited workers in 
the future. They call this a dialectic approach. Indeed, if the power is in the 
Communists' hands, then why don't they hire workers at the state factories so as to 
avoid the conflicts between labor and capital? Of course, Communist theoreticians are 
trying to find an answer to the question, which still is very annoying. They believe 
workers were spoiled as the hegemony during the soviet times, whereas nowadays 
they refuse to work for meager salaries. Probably, this also explains why more than 
600,000 Moldovan proletarians prefer to be exploited in the capitalist Europe and 
refuse to return in Moldova, knowing that the Communists, who recommend 
themselves as their defenders, are in power.  
 
Also due to the soviet time spoiling, nowadays the working class prefers to sell its 
labor at a very high price, which scares potential investors away. If Communist 
theoreticians were consistent in their syllogisms, they would have to conclude that 
their victory in 2001 parliamentary elections was the result of the spoiled citizens' 
expectation that once they bring Communists to power they would get in return living 
standards they enjoyed during URSS. If so, then the next natural conclusion would be 
that URSS was an empire of evil, which contributed to the degeneration of the 
working class, fact proven by the lack of foreign investments. The latter in its turn 
would tarnish the enforcement of the ruling party's electoral program. As a result the 
party would have to comply with the existing realities, namely to get bourgeois.  
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Worsening relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol 
November 11, 2002  
 
 
In early November OSCE and guarantor countries' experts have declared that 
negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol reached a deadlock. According to them, 
negotiations could be resumed only after the parties clarify their positions and 
interests in settling the conflict via federalization of the Republic of Moldova. Rather 
it would be more appropriate to say that since OSCE presented the draft on 
federalization of the Republic of Moldova, negotiations haven't even started. Only 
several consultation meeting were held in August - October between the five parties. 
Furthermore, those meeting were accompanied by a tough propaganda war. For 
instance Chisinau propaganda machine for one year didn't cease speaking about 
"Smirnov Mafia and criminal regime", whereas Tiraspol about "economic blockade" 
and 10-th anniversary of the "Moldova's aggression against the Transdnistrian 
Republic". That is why the fact that bilateral relations are the worst since 1992, comes 
as no surprise. Tiraspol's new initiative falls perfectly within OSCE's recent call to 
Chisinau and Tiraspol to clarify their positions. Thus Tiraspol intends to show that it 
has not only military but also economic power equal to Chisinau. That is why both 
parties would be treated equally at the negotiation table, as provided for in 1997 
Memorandum signed by Republic of Moldova President, Petru Lucinschi, and 
Transdnistrian Leader, Igor Smirnov.  
 
In this respect, on November 4 Transdnistrian leader, Igor Smirnov, issued a decree 
on an additional 20% tax on the goods imported from the Republic of Moldova. 
According to Smirnov the action was nothing but "an adequate response to the 
economic blockade set by the Republic of Moldova" when it introduced new customs 
seals, as a result of its adhesion to the World Trade Organization. According to 
Tiraspol "economic blockade" is Chisinau's refusal to unconditionally hand it over its 
customs seals, so that Tiraspol could continue its uncontrolled foreign trade.  
 
Given the above said, the deadlock reached in negotiations was easy to foresee. That 
is why last summer debates in mass media were pointless. On the one hand, 
Moldovan authorities, failing to understand what exactly the federalization means and 
how could it be achieved, were keen to announce loud the success awaiting them in 
settling Transdnistrian conflict once OSCE had presented its federalization plan. 
Democratic Agrarian Party, the two Socialist parties and Ravnopravie Movement 
unconditionally supported authorities' position. On the other hand, center-right forces 
opposed federalization. Social-Democratic parties agreed in principle to 
federalization, however insisted on the ways it could be achieved.  
 
In Transdnistria, on the contrary OSCE draft wasn't received with much enthusiasm. 
Only the Chief of Diplomatic Service, Valerii Litskai, expressed some optimism with 
regard to the federalization plan, immediately after Kiev reunion where it was first 
presented. Local experts pointed that Litskai had a big price to pay for this, as he was 
for a long time in Smirnov disfavor. Later on, Tiraspol leaders formulated a new 
position, totally different from that of Chisinau. Thus, the Chief of the Supreme 
Soviet of Tiraspol, Grigorii Marakutsa and Litskai stated they saw no difference 
between a federation and a confederation. For them the most acceptable variant of  
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building a unified state is the Serbia-Montenegro model, or the way Bosnia was 
formed in line with the Dayton agreement.  
 
Let's then consider the differences. One may say in Chisinau the Communist Party 
and the Social Democratic Alliance agree in principle with the federalization plan. 
Both see federalization as a realistic scenario. Indeed, if Russia were considered to be 
the main strategic partner and mediator in the negotiation process, then it would have 
a major saying in the process. Evghenii Primakov, former Prime Minister voiced 
Russia's position on the resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict: neither Moldova a 
unitary state, nor Transdnistria an independent state. On the other hand, another 
Russian official, Boris Pastuhov stated that in the settlement of the Transdnistrian 
conflict "Russia would withdraw from Moldova upon the withdrawal of its munitions, 
however it would do so in such a manner so as to stay there forever". This in fact 
summarizes the framework for settling the Transdnistrian conflict. And that is exactly 
why Communist Party and Social-Democratic Alliance view federalization as 
acceptable. Domestic experts believe Communist Party lacks a clear vision on how 
federalization could be achieved; nevertheless it supports federalization, as it would 
imply a constitutional reform. The latter would allow them to keep up electoral 
promises on which a moratorium was set under the PACE Resolution, namely 
declaring Russian a state language, revising the history taught in schools, etc. 
However, the risks of federalization are hard to evaluate. Even if we admit that an 
agreement would be reached with Tiraspol on a classic federalization model, as the 
German one, still two extremely complicated problems would arise during the 
federalization process.  
 
The first one is related to the number of the Federation subjects. Transdnistrian 
leaders insist on a federation formed by two subjects enjoying equal rights and equal 
representation in the Upper Chamber. The situation gets even more complicated as the 
Gagauz leaders insist that the autonomy should also be a subject of the federation, 
enjoying the same rights as the other two. In fact, the newly elected Bashkan 
(Governor) Gheorghe Tabunshcik, supported in elections by the Communist Party 
promised the very same thing during the electoral campaign. However, a federation 
formed out of three subjects based on ethnic criteria, having asymmetrical structure 
would be very dangerous, especially as Tiraspol and Comrat used to be strategic 
partners in fighting against Chisinau in 1990 - 1994. Upon federalization, those two 
subjects would hold 2/3 of the seats in the Upper Chamber of the Bicameral 
Parliament. This scenario is totally unacceptable for Chisinau.  
 
Given the aforesaid, it's difficult to understand how Moldovan authorities see 
federalization in action. In fact, President Vladimir Voronin refrained from 
commenting on the issue. Only the Prime-Minister Vasile Tarlev, several Communist 
deputies, and governmental press endorsed the federalization process, without giving 
further details.  
 
Social-Democratic Alliance sees federation as formed of 7-8 subjects acting within 
the limits set in the OSCE draft. This would allow decentralization of power in the 
Republic of Moldova and would compensate for the would-be domination of 
Transdnistria and Gagauzia in the Upper Chamber of the Bicameral Parliament. 
However, this scenario runs counter to the Communist Party plans to reform 
administrative-territorial units. Communist Party didn't give up the idea of restoring  
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rayon system, depriving administrative units of economic sustainability. In such a 
case, rayons may just be internal units of a federation subject. This would very much 
complicate the structure of the federal state.  
 
The second problem relates to the federation building procedure. It seems Chisinau 
prefers Republic of Moldova federation to be built according to the Russian 
Federation model. Namely, the center would grant additional prerogatives to the 
provinces, until they acquire the status of federation subjects. Under this scenario in 
the future federation national sovereignty would belong to all Moldovan people, not 
just its subjects. It is not surprising that 42 articles of the federalization draft were 
copied from the Constitution of the Russian Federation.  
 
However, Tiraspol leaders do not accept the said method. They would rather prefer a 
federation formed by equal subjects according to the US model. For this to happen, 
Republic of Moldova would have to firstly recognize Transdnistria's independence, 
and then the two equal subjects would conclude an agreement on founding the 
federation. It was Transdnistria's supporters and lobbysts in Russia, such as 
Constantin Zatulin, who recommended Tiraspol this scenario. It implies that the 
sovereignty belongs to the subjects of the federation which choose to delegate some 
prerogatives to the federal center. Indeed, if the subjects were to disagree on any 
issue, they would withdraw the prerogatives they had delegated. That is exactly why 
Tiraspol leaders claim there is no difference between a federation and a confederation. 
This time, the scenario is unacceptable to the Republic of Moldova. If Republic of 
Moldova were to make the first step and recognize Transdnistria, there would be no 
guarantees that Transdnistria would make the second step and sign the federative 
agreement with the Republic of Moldova. Even if this was to happen, Transdnistria' 
status as founder of the Federal Moldovan state would trigger a real revolution in the 
RM statehood and would tie the country forever to Russia. The said scenario would 
grant Transdnistria independence and entitle it to interfere in the RM internal affairs. 
Probably that is exactly what the Russian dignitary meant when saying that Russia 
should leave Moldova in such a manner so as to stay there forever. It is very unlikely 
that the opposition would go for such a scenario.  
 
Going back to the recent developments we should mention that Moldovan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs reacted rather strangely to Transdnistrian initiative to set an additional 
tax on goods imported from the RM. The Ministry appealed to foreign Embassies 
operating in Chisinau to assist them in settling this difficult situation. Needless to say, 
only guarantor countries could interfere. It is worth mentioning that Chisinau and 
Tiraspol relations reached a deadlock immediately after Smirnov's consultations with 
Moscow. Furthermore, one could notice Russia's increasing support to Transdnistria 
recently. For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Tiraspol regime 
was not a criminal one, consequently it is worth negotiating with. Another example, 
Russia forgave Tiraspol's $100 million debts for natural gas supplies in return for the 
possibility to evacuate Russian munitions from the territories Russia acknowledge as 
being under the sovereignty of the RM. This could only be interpreted as an aid to 
Transdnistria, whose annual budget amounts $80 million USD. Interestingly enough, 
Russia cancels Transdnistria's $100 million debt at the time Russian forces fighting in 
Chechnya sue Defense Ministry to recover several millions USD in debts. Forgiving 
Transdnistria's debts is very much different from the approach to Chisinau, namely 
 13
the pressure exercised by Gazprom on Chisinau to regularly pay for the consumed 
gas.  
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Russia's generous gift would grant Tiraspol enough time and money to play 
"economic blockade" game and to procrastinate negotiation process.  
 
One could understand Russian elite behavior. RM is of strategic importance for 
Russia, neither for military nor for economic reasons, but for totally different reasons. 
The fact is that RM is the only country in the world Russia could still beat on the 
military and diplomatic field. The Speaker of the Russian State Duma, Ghenadi 
Selezniov, who during a recent visit to Moldova recognized that Russia supported the 
edification of a Transdnistrian state, confirmed this fact. From this perspective RM is 
the perfect target for Russia's nationalistic forces writing mockery articles about RM. 
They sublimate their damaged imperial complex, especially after USSR collapse and 
Balkans crisis when no one heard Russia's protests and threats to help Miloshevici 
fight UE and US double standards. RM should be honored as it is of strategic 
importance for such a world power as Russia.  
 
A similar "adequate reaction" in line with its attitude to Tiraspol regime, is to be 
expected from Ukraine as well. And this because Transdnistria's goods marked by the 
old customs stamps are transiting Ukraine territory.  
 
Under those circumstances, why wouldn't Transdnistria enjoy the support of guarantor 
and mediator countries and set an economic blockade on the RM? Even the Chechens 
declares djihad to Russia, without enjoying the official support of any country. In this 
respect it is worth mentioning the letter of condolences sent by Transdnistrian leader 
Igor Smirnov to Vladimir Putin with regard to Nord-Ost tragedy, reading that 
"Transdnistrian people know very well what aggression and terrorism is". However, 
Smirnov didn't specify what was the difference between the Chechen separatism 
promoting terrorism and Transdnistrian separatism. Smirnov went beyond all the 
limits in his propaganda campaign. A witness to this may well be the famous 
journalist and supporter of Transdnistria, Alexandr Nevzorov, who in his movie 
"Buchet Moldavii" features fearless Cazacs from Transdnistria, who in order to show 
off their heroic deeds cripple the bodies of Moldovan policemen. The movie was 
broadcast on Russian TV, relayed on the entire CIS territory, in 2000. No one 
protested and no one wondered what was the difference between Transdnistrian and 
Chechen terrorism. It's true, speaker of the Russian State Duma provided some insight 
on this. Transdnistrian breakaway regime was supported by the Russian Army, which 
according to a statement made by Smirnov in 1996 in the State Duma, "was under the 
Russian commandment during daytime, whereas during the nighttime was fighting for 
the ideals of Tiraspol regime". In the separatist Chechnya, Russian Army burst in 
early 1995 to "reinforce constitutional order", without being provoked to do so. No 
one mentions double standards here. Smirnov doesn't even remember the 
provocations of the "third force", which after Transdnistrian victory over "Moldovan 
aggression" totally disappeared from its territory together with "combat" Kostenco.  
 
The case of the RM is different, as it chose such partners and mediators. For instance, 
facing the same problems generated by "the strategic partner" Georgia and Azerbaijan 
compensated the biased character by inviting other strategic allies such as US, 
Turkey, etc.  
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Under the given circumstances, opposition forces in Chisinau, such as Social-
Democratic Party, have no other solution than demand the revision of the negotiation 
rules. However, it is very unlikely that someone would pay attention to such demands 
as long as RM itself cannot decide how does it wants Transdnistrian conflict settled. 
A similar proposal was made by the Social Liberal Party on "freezing the conflict" in 
order to look for new solutions and partners. Recent developments show that 
Transdnistrian regime gets stronger and stronger day by day. It is known for a fact 
that Transdnistrian administration and its supporters in Moscow strive to grant 
Russian citizenship to all Transdnistrian citizens, and to transfer the public estate in 
the property of Russia. In such a case, what's the use of RM formal sovereignty on 
Transdnistria? The variant recommended by the Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party 
is not to be neglected. They seem to accept the model of Serbia - Montenegro 
suggested by Transdnistria. Under a would-be increase of citizens' sympathy to 
Romania as a result of its entry in NATO and EU, and Transdnistria's clear orientation 
towards Russia and Ukraine the Communist and Christian-Democrats call for double 
citizenship seems logical. Accordingly, Moldova and Transdnistria relations would 
follow exactly the ones between Serbia and Montenegro.  
 
In conclusion OSCE would have to wait for a while until Chisinau and Tiraspol would 
define their position on settling the conflict via federalization, unless a major 
international player would show them the right way.  
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Moldovan politics labyrinth 
November 18, 2002  
 
 
A series of significant events happened lately in the Republic of Moldova. Firstly, 
clear signs came to light that Moldovan top leadership gave up their electoral 
promises. Secondly, European component of the foreign policy has become at least as 
important as the CIS one. Thirdly, Communist leadership has showed persistence in 
settling Transdnistrian crisis. And last but not least, the recent developments within 
the ruling party might have a negative impact on the political stability in the country.  
The aforesaid gain a special importance on the eve of upcoming local elections. 
Furthermore, electoral campaign shall be launched at the time Communists would 
celebrate a two-year anniversary of their victory in parliamentary elections. This 
would be another occasion for their political opponents to assess the way ruling party 
had kept its promises. This is the more important as President Voronin stated he 
would be guided by three major goals in exercising his mandate: a) fighting poverty, 
b) fighting corruption, c) settling Transdnistrian conflict.  
 
Currently, ruling party is criticized for "yielding" to World Bank and IMF, previously 
viewed by Communist Party (CP) as "the tools of the American Imperialism". The 
Communist Party yielded given its lack of qualified personnel to implement its 
electoral program. The fact was mentioned during all the previous CP Plenary 
sessions, which seem to do nothing more than acknowledge the existing state of 
affairs. Lack of qualified personnel also accounts for the frequent Government shifts. 
However it is not the only problem Communists are facing. Last year President stated 
that CP has no strategy for the country future development. And this despite their 
political and electoral Program and the Government program they adopted: Economic 
recovery - rebirth of the country. Under the pressure of foreign debts and lack of 
professional personnel Moldovan authorities had to balance between implementing 
their electoral program and resuming the policies promoted by the previous 
Governments. Finally the ruling party decided to obediently follow the advice of 
World Bank and other financial institutions and engaged to elaborate the National 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP). PRSP concept has already been made public and 
the final version is to be developed by spring 2003, then it is to be implemented 
within the next 3-4 years. At the Forum hosted jointly by Moldovan Government and 
World Bank, President Voronin stated that the strategy is aimed at: sustainable 
economic development and boosting small business; social guarantees; enhancing the 
efficiency of the public bodies and the quality of services provided. Prime Minister, 
Vasile Tarlev, and Minister of Economy Stefan Odagiu publicly stated that PRSP 
should become a cornerstone document in Government activity, whereas public 
officers should take PRSP very seriously. Consequently all the other strategies 
developed by the current and former governors should all be subordinated to PRSP. In 
his turn, Luca Barbone, World Bank Regional Director stated that the institution he is 
representing would organize next spring a Donor's Forum to raise the money for the 
Strategy implementation. According to some preliminary estimation Strategy 
enforcement would require $ 200 million. Consequently, Communist authorities 
would have no grounds to begrudge World Bank and IMF. Furthermore, the strategy 
provides for fostering democratic institutions and civic participation in the elaboration 
of the strategy. The advantages are obvious, in exchange for authorities' cooperation 
World Bank and IMF would aid them in restructuring or even canceling Moldova's  
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foreign debts to the Paris Club. It seems Communists have made the right choice to 
cooperate with the "instruments of the American imperialism", instead of 
implementing their own electoral programs, venture which anyhow is deemed to fail.  
 
Foreign policy itself suffered some major changes. Communist authorities became 
increasingly involved in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and declared 
"European integration" one of their foreign policy key priorities. To cite only the two 
extremely important documents issued in November. Namely the PRSP concept and 
Presidential Decree on establishing a National Commission entrusted to develop the 
European Integration Strategy. Both documents refer to the European Integration. 
Under the two documents, Republic of Moldova is to become first an EU associated 
member and later one a full rights member. So far, discussions centered around the 
special status Republic of Moldova would enjoy, given its vicinity to EU borders, 
once Romania joins EU in 2007.  
 
However, one should be very cautious with regard to authorities intention to joint EU. 
For instance the leader of the Communist Faction in Parliament stated Communist 
Party had strong intentions to join EU, however Moldova's main economic interests 
lie at the "East". If we are to consider the fact that Stepaniuc represents the orthodox 
wing of the party and last year he attended the Congress of CIS Communist Parties 
where at issue was rehabilitate Iosif Stalin, and that he continues to idolize Vladimir 
Lenin, we may conclude that EU integration wasn't a benevolent choice of the 
Communist Party. Once Lenin was saying "politics is a concentrated expression of 
economy". If the main economic interests lie at the "East", than it is very unlikely 
long-term political interests to lie at the West. Another illustration is lobbying 
Russia's interests in privatizing strategic economic units. On the other hand, pro-
European policy may bring immediate benefits in settling the foreign debt problem 
and Transdnistrian conflict.  
 
The latter is of special importance as all the European dignitaries visiting Moldova 
lately, besides discussing possible technical assistance to the Republic of Moldova, 
inquired on the progress registered in settling Transdnistrian conflict. This seems to 
work in favor of Communists. They accepted the draft on the Republic of Moldova 
federalization submitted by OSCE and endorsed by EU and US. The latest actions of 
the Transdnistrian authorities, which disagree with the OSCE draft, have presented 
them not exactly in a favorable light. Chisinau may view as its diplomatic 
achievement the fact that an OSCE commission including diplomats from 15 
countries inspected the customs offices at the Moldovan Ukrainian border. Obviously, 
Transdnistrian authorities didn't allow the commission inspection. All the aforesaid 
gives Moldova some chances to settle its tensed relations with Ukraine with the help 
of EU and US institutions. Noteworthy, Ukraine is not exactly in its best position, due 
to allegations of selling anti-radar munitions to Iraq. A year ago EU and US 
summoned Ukraine for allowing the transit of Transdnistrian goods on it territory, 
despite the old customs stamps used. Chisinau viewed the transit as smuggling. Under 
the pressure of European institutions and US Ukraine might yield and comply with 
the international regulations on the transit of goods from Transdnistria. In its turn, this 
might determine Tiraspol leaders to be more cooperative in negotiations with 
Chishinau. And that's where European orientation priority comes from.  
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Nevertheless, there are clear signs that the middle level party members disagree with 
the opportunistic foreign policy promoted by the party leadership. There are more and 
more articles in the Communist press referring to class structure of the Moldovan 
society, reviving working class and its fight against capital. Lack of understanding 
between the top leadership and middle level structures may result in a party scission. 
Domestic analysts believe there are clear signs of growing tensions within the 
Communist Party, namely the President didn't attend the last Party Plenary session, he 
also didn't attend the celebration ceremonies dedicated to 85th anniversary of the 
Bolshevik Revolution. If true, Republic of Moldova may found itself in a very 
difficult situation as it is a parliamentary republic and the lack of stable parliamentary 
majority may result in a breakup between Presidency, Parliament and Government. 
However, this scenario is very unlikely. Currently, there is no other political leader 
within the Communist Party able to equal Vladimir Voronin and to overtake the party 
leadership. The fact that Communists obediently continue to vote even if there are 
disagreements is another illustration to this effect. Furthermore, to reply to orthodox 
wing accusations of opportunism and deviation from Marxism-Leninism, Communist 
leaders demonstrate their friendship with China. Although Moldova's trade with 
China accounts only for 0.3% of the total foreign trade, high rank Moldovan and 
Chinese delegations exchange official visits enabling Moldovan authorities to learn 
the "positive experience" of combining capitalist economy with authoritarian politics.  
Some analysts believe a portion of the Communist Party electorate, especially the 
Russian speaking one, disappointed by the party's opportunistic policy on the one 
hand and by the tough policy adopted in relations with Gagauz Yeri and Transdnistria 
on the other, would rather vote for the two socialist parties and "Ravnopravie" 
(Equality) Movement. The latter claim to defend the rights of Russian speaking 
population of Moldova. Another portion of the Communist electorate is expected to 
migrate to the Social Democratic Alliance (SDM) headed by the former Prime-
Minister, Dumitru Braghis, who chose an equidistant approach towards CIS and EU. 
All the aforesaid could lead to a decreasing Communist Party rating. Furthermore, 
although fighting corruption was declared one of the top priorities, during the 
Communist governing no major case was investigated or brought to justice. As for the 
smuggling, it wasn't halted either, fact confirmed by the Prime Minister himself. 
According to the media outlets, Communists' activity resumed to redistribution of 
private property into the hands of groups close to the Communist Party. Furthermore, 
key figures in the Communist Government have become the key actors in corruption 
scandals, namely Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev, Parliament Deputy Chair, Vadim 
Misin, Moldova Ambassador to Russia, Vladimir Turcanu, etc. It is expected that on 
the eve of elections President Voronin would get rid of some of those officials 
damaging the Communist Party image, including Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev. 
However, it would be difficult for the President to justify such shifts in Government. 
On the one hand, Tarlev Government claims to have secured a 6% GDP growth, so it 
wouldn't be logical to get rid of "such a good Prime Minister". Furthermore, ousting 
Tarlev on the grounds of illegal operations would raise the question on how the 
Communist selected him.  
 
There are two options for the Communist Party to prevent the migration of 
Communist electorate towards above-mentioned forces. The first one is to 
compensate the would-be loses via administrative levers. Communists already tested 
this method during the recent Bashkan elections in Gagauz Yeri when the entire 
administration machine electioneered in favor of the Communist candidate. As for the  
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second one, Communists accepted Christian-Democrats' initiative to amend the Law 
on Political Parties in view of raising the minimum number of party members 
required for the party registration from 5,000 to 15,000. The Communist faction has 
already voted the amendment in the first reading. If adopted in the final reading, then 
all the political parties would found themselves in a rather difficult situation on the 
eve of local elections. Instead of devising their electoral strategies they would have to 
recruit 15,000 members. Half of the 26 existent parties wouldn't be able to comply 
with the new requirement, otherwise 20% of the citizens entitled to votes would 
become party members. The two socialist parties as well as many others to whom the 
Communist electorate might migrate, are among those having scarce chances to 
recruit 15,000 members. Indeed, in the short run only the Communist Party and the 
Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party are to benefit of the amendment. The Christian-
Democrats would win on the expense of the other center right forces and they are 
ready to pay this price, otherwise they wouldn't came up with the initiative. The 
Communists would benefit by eliminating their would-be competitors. Christian-
Democrats' scenario proves to be almost perfect. They recommend raising the 
minimal number of members to a number the Communist already have; consequently 
no further efforts would be required. In the long run, the initiative would strengthen 
center-left and center-right political parties, which are likely to become Christian-
Democrat's opponents in the future.  
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Poverty reduction factors 
November 25, 2002  
 
 
A month ago, Prime-Minister Vasile Tarlev declared that elaboration of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (PRSP) should become a priority for all the public officers. In his 
turn, Stefan Odagiu, pointed that once developed PRSP would become a cornerstone 
in Government activity. Last week governmental press published the concept of 
PRSP. All the other documents and strategies developed by the incumbent or former 
Governments would have to be subordinated to PRSP. Given the fact that PRSP is 
actively promoted by international organizations, the ruling party gave up the 
enforcement their electoral program and decided to coordinate its activity with the 
WB and IMF.  
 
Although the deadline for PRSP elaboration expires next March, activists of civic 
NGOs have already embarked upon debating it. Last week Institute of Public Policies 
with the support of WB launched a series of seminars in this respect. Participants 
gathered to debate on sources of economic growth and rural development.  
 
Independent experts agree that in the case of Moldova there are four sources of 
sustainable economic growth that might as well contribute to poverty reduction, 
especially in the rural areas, wherein the great majority of the population resides. So, 
the following are the sources: boosting entrepreneurship, especially small and 
medium businesses; ensuring a sustainable macroeconomic balance; investments; and 
efficient and accountable governing.  
 
It would be very difficult for Communist authorities to ensure all the aforesaid. 
Firstly, according to some experts GDP growth registered last year and this year is not 
the merit of the incumbent governing. Indeed, despite statistics manipulations, there 
were some objective factors, which have influenced to a certain extent the economic 
growth. This refers to the reforms conducted by the previous governments, whose 
effects were expected to show up 2-3 years later. Furthermore, regional economy 
registered a growth due to the gradual recovery from the financial crisis in Russia of 
1998. Consequently, domestic and regional conjuncture is accountable for the 
economic growth registered in the last two years. Experts claim a professional and 
reforming team in governing would have contributed to a much more significant 
economic growth, able to lead in the long run to sustainable economic growth. Still, 
Communists' also had their contribution to the economic growth, namely the 
Government refrained from enforcing the Communist Party electoral program and 
from making any major mistakes. Nevertheless, Communist party should share the 
merit with WB and IMF representatives who closely monitor the incumbent 
governing not allowing it to slip away from the agreed standards.  
 
According to the official statistics private sector accounts for 85% of GDP. We could 
only wonder, what is then the Government role? Obviously, the government should 
work towards establishing a favorable environment for business. However a recent 
poll conducted among businessmen shows the contrary, the pressure on their business 
has significantly increased since Communists came to power.  
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As for the second one, namely macroeconomic balance, there are problems as well. In 
spite of pro-European declarations, incumbent governing insists that Moldova's major 
economic interests lie to the East, in CIS and Eurasia Union. Noteworthy Ukraine and 
Belarus, Moldova's biggest partners after Russia, are undergoing a deep political crisis 
that might lead to economic and financial crisis. If true, then a regional financial crisis 
is to be expected.  
 
As for third factor ensuring sustainable economic growth, the situation is even worse. 
After Communists damaged their relations with such strategic investors as Union 
Fenosa, Lafarge and others, it is hard to believe that any investor would seriously 
consider investing in Republic of Moldova in the nearest future. An illustration of this 
is the Moldtelecom privatization. There are problems with regard to domestic 
investments too. Domestic finances are so meager that they cannot boost investment 
activity. Money that is wired by Moldovan citizens working abroad could be a 
potential source of investments. The amount yearly wired is comparable to the yearly 
state budget. If Government manages to ensure the protection of the right on property 
and abolish bureaucratic barriers, then population's savings might turn into 
investments. However, Government does nothing in this respect.  
 
And finally, ensuring an efficient and accountable governing is a task as difficult to 
achieve as the ones mentioned above. It's hard to speak about an accountable 
governing when the incumbent one is undertaking actions destabilizing social and 
political situation. For instance, the recent ruling party's initiatives to revise the 
judicial system and local public administration risk triggering another deep political 
crisis.  
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Is there a Social Democratic Prospect for the Republic of Moldova? 
Igor Botan, December 2, 2002  
 
 
On November 30 the Democratic Party organized with the support of the French 
Foundation Jean Jaures the conference entitled "A Comparative Analysis of Electoral 
Trends in Europe and in the Republic of Moldova". The aim of the conference was to 
assess the electoral prospects of social democracy in the Republic of Moldova.  
 
The conference centered upon the evolution of the social democratic doctrine in 
Europe and tried to assess the performance of social democratic parties. The current 
electoral trends in Europe are not homogenous throughout different regions. These 
variations in regional trends are nonetheless comprised within a generally accepted 
value framework involving direct elections, the separation of powers, the majority 
rule, opposition rights, the freedom of expression, etc. This value framework also 
serves as the foundation for the European integration processes currently being 
applied in stages across Europe. One can therefore state that these differences are 
rather alternatives, or maybe even alternative trends, than trends.  
 
Social democracy emerged in an endeavor to fundamentally revise the Marxist 
ideology as a pre-condition for industrialization at the end of the 19th c. The reformist 
revisionism, supported by Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, envisioned two 
correlated projects, the moral and the social-prospective ones. Democratic socialism 
advocated a democratic society and individual freedom and stressed the importance 
and opportunity for a peaceful, legal and democratic way towards socialism. The main 
task for social democrats was winning political rights by the masses at large which 
they could use to improve their socio-economic condition.  
 
The French sociologists grouped around Benoit Malon, Alexandre Millerand and Jean 
Jaures took a reformist-pragmatic stand too. The constructive socialism theorized by 
the Belgian Henri de Man turned into a profound, philosophical and moral doctrine.  
 
The emergence of these trends was part of the efforts to channel the worker 
movement towards a peaceful effort to improve the conditions for economic 
development, socialize capitals and democratize the political life.  
 
The major objective of the social democratic parties has been to guarantee all social 
rights, remove any form of social discrimination and ensure the premises for a free 
development of individuals as a pre-condition for the development of the entire 
society.  
 
The post-war ideological evolution of the social democratic and socialist parties in 
developed countries was characterized by a rejection of revolutionary Marxism and 
the focus on the reformist pragmatic strategy. After 1970 social democracy has seen a 
strong drive towards globalization through increased international participation and 
cooperation of social democratic parties from Latin America, Africa and Asia within 
the Socialist International. At the same time social democracy got over its class 
nature. Social democratic parties are no longer exclusively worker parties. A 
deliberate extension of their social basis has occurred in the result of their ideological 
adaptation to concrete social and historical conditions.  
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Thus, the social democratic doctrine has been founded on the social evolutionism, 
humanism and the idea of respect for the individual right to choice and decision. 
Freedom, democracy, solidarity, equity and justice are the principles and values of 
social democracy. The former three form the defining conceptual triad of this doctrine 
from which other social democratic solutions flow.  
 
The social democratic state involves the existence of one strong organizational 
structure, of sovereign rights and the legitimate monopoly of coercion power. The 
authority of state resides in the beliefs and consensus reached through free elections, 
intellectual competence and moral status. The ideologists of this doctrine believe that 
it is obligatory that social control be exercised over state power.  
 
At present, 18 out of 38 considered European countries are ruled by social democrats. 
In three countries, United Kingdom, Greece and Sweeden, the social democrats are 
ruling on their own without allies. In the other 15 countries the social democrats rule 
within coalition governments together with liberals and Christian democrats. The 
Christian democrats form coalition governments in 13 European countries, and in 
Spain they govern on their own. The liberals are part of coalition governments in 21 
European countries and in Andorra they rule alone. The conservatives participate in 
coalition governments in nine countries. Ethnic minority parties participate in 
coalition governments in four countries; green, agricultural/regional and nationalist 
parties participate in three governments each. According to the percentage held by 
parties of different ideological orientation, Europe is "pink colored".  
 
Social democratic parties are very powerful even in countries where they are in 
opposition holding about 10 to 30 percent of votes. On the second place by weight are 
the Christian democratic parties. The liberals, although the most often participants in 
coalition governments, hold a percentage much lower than the social democrats or the 
Christian democrats. This is explained by the fact that liberal parties have been 
practically always professional parties and generators of ideas that are often taken 
over and applied both by social democrats and Christian democrats and conservatives. 
Thus, in 12 countries the social democrats govern together with liberals. In other six 
countries the Christian democrats are the ones that govern together with the liberals. 
In three highly developed countries the social democrats, liberals and Christian 
democrats govern together.  
 
For a better comparison of electoral trends in Europe and Moldova it is logical to 
examine separately regional trends in the Central and East Europe (CEE), the Baltics, 
Western Europe, Scandinavia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  
One could state that for the CEE social democracy has been an adequate option for 
doing away with communism and avoiding sliding into some other extreme. The 
experience of these countries is particularly relevant for Moldova. Thus, in nine out of 
12 CEE countries the social democrats are at rule. Only in Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
Bosnia, where nationalistic parties are very strong, the social democrats are not ruling. 
In the cases of Slovakia and Bulgaria this is explained by the fact that, on the one 
hand, the previous governments of nationalist and communist orientation have been 
compromised, and, on the other hand, the bite of joining NATO and the EU has been 
so appealing that center right collations have replaced previous governments in order 
not to miss the prospect of joining the EU. Thus, these two examples only confirm the 
fact that social democracy has offered Central and Eastern Europe the necessary tools  
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for a gradual transformation so that these integrate later in the EU. As mentioned 
above, one of the most interesting exceptions has been Bulgaria where the last 
elections were won by the National Movement Simeon II of conservative orientation, 
led by the former monarch. This movement was set up on the eve of elections and 
won in the first round with 42.7 percent of votes. This example shows how important 
can the personality of the leader be as compared to the doctrine, all the more so when 
the leader is associated with certain aspirations, such as joining the EU in the case of 
Bulgaria. This is a good example for Moldova in that it shows why the number of 
members necessary for the registration of a political party should not be increased in 
an arbitrary way to 15,000.  
 
A similar example has existed in Lithuania where a representative of the Canadian 
Diaspora, Vaira Vike-Freigerga, was voted by the Lithuanian Parliament for the 
position of President and then a right-wing party, the newly formed New Era, was set 
up to support her later winning parliamentary elections in the first round. The 
motivation for such an electoral behavior has been the same as that in the case of 
Bulgaria - the aspiration to join NATO and the EU. It is to be mentioned that in the 
Baltics the social democrats initially had a strong position only in Lithuania. In 
Estonia and Latvia the liberals and Christian democrats were more powerful. This 
state of affairs has been preserved to date. Thus we can see that in the Baltics too 
social democracy can be a solution but not a panacea. It is important though for the 
political movements to set for themselves reasonable aims for which they should 
secure their citizens' support.  
 
At this stage it is difficult to talk about the existence of an electoral tradition in the 
Baltics. One thing that is certain is that the organization of free elections immediately 
after the collapse of the USSR has been beneficial for the adjustment of the structure 
of parliaments to the new conditions and tasks for Euro-Atlantic integration, which 
thing failed to happen in the CIS. In any case there is no doubt that in the CEE and the 
Baltics, especially after their integration in NATO and the EU, a tradition will emerge 
which is going to be very different from that in Western Europe. Also, there is no 
doubt that the external factor, first of all the prospect of joining the EU, has channeled 
the electoral behavior in the post-communist countries towards social democracy. 
From this perspective one can probably speak of a mutually advantageous initiative 
for the EU and the former communist countries. Although the integration of the latter 
into the EU is very costy, this is probably the only reasonable solution for the threats 
flowing from the instability in the immediate neighborhood of the EU. The bloody 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia only confirm this assumption. Here it is worth 
mentioning the curious development that has recently occurred in the elections in 
Turkey. In conditions when the signals related to Turkey's joining the EU were 
preponderantly negative, the voters turned their back to the social democrats and tied 
their hopes to the Islamic movements. Surely the political and economic situation of 
the country were not brilliant at the time of elections. Yet, immediately after the 
results were made public, the European bureaucrats appeared to have changed 
significantly their opinions about Turkey's chances of joining the EU.  
 
Social democracy has been reigning in the EU Member States for a long time and in 
deeply rooted way. Despite historical collisions in Germany and Austria since 1919 
the social democrats have had the support of approximately 1/3 of voters. In the 
aftermath of World War II, the social democrats governed for years in Germany,  
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France and Great Britain, alternating in government with the Christian democrats and 
the conservatives. It is well known that in the post-war period huge efforts were made 
in order not to allow extremist movements get to power in Western Europe. Among 
others fascism was banned because it was defeated in an armed conflict and was 
condemned within an international judiciary process. Although responsible of crimes 
against humanity comparable with those committed by fascists, communism was not 
banned because it was not defeated in a direct conflagration but, on the contrary, was 
the one that beat fascism. Nonetheless, the ascension of communism in the west was 
restrained in various legal ways and that is why it developed firm roots only in Italy 
and France where it enjoyed the support of the intelligentsia. Yet, after the collapse of 
the global communist system in the last decades of the 20th century the communist 
parties in these countries have enjoyed as much as three to fine percent of votes 
compared to the 25 to 30 in the first post war decades. After the fall of dictatorships in 
the Iberian Peninsula and Greece, these countries have shown the same symptoms - 
the accession to government of social democrats and Christian democrats. At present 
social democrats rule in such EU Member States as Germany, Greece, Finland, Great 
Britain and Sweden, and the Christian democrats and conservatives in Austria, 
Norway, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. In the rest of the EU coalitions with a 
strong liberal component are ruling.  
 
It appears that the social democrats enjoy a special role in the Scandinavian countries. 
In Sweden the vote for social democrats has varied in the last 50 years between 35 to 
47 percent. Only in the last elections of 2001 the social democrats received 25 
percent, but their most powerful rival, the Conservative Party, received one percent 
less and succeeded to form a government coalition with the Christian democrats and 
the liberals. A similar situation is being witnessed in Denmark where since 1945 their 
percentage varied between 30 to 43 percents. In the last elections the liberals received 
one percent less than the social democrats and created a right-wing coalition. In Island 
too the social democrats received in the last two electoral cycles 37 and 26 percent 
respectively, thus becoming the main rivals of the conservatives who dominated the 
political scene in the post-war period. Although Finland is not a Scandinavian 
country, for convenience we will examine it in the same category. In the post war 
period the social democratic party of Finland was the most powerful party, 
permanently holding 20 to 30 percent. At present it is the ruling party.  
 
Although Moldova is a CIS Member State, it is worth mentioning the fact that it takes 
a special position in this body and is unique. In Moldova, for the first time ever and in 
the most legal way through direct and free vote the Communist Party obtained 
absolute victory.  
 
Still, the electoral behavior and the performance of Moldovan political parties have 
much in common with the ones in the rest of the CIS. It is only natural for things to be 
that way. The first free electoral cycle started in 1993-1994, after the parliaments of 
the Soviet republics elected in 1990 started to dissolve as a result of serious political 
crisis determined by intestine fights among various faction and groups close to the 
executive power. At the same time, the privatization of state property was being 
carried out which determined the political elite to behave in a certain way. This 
triggered a corresponding reaction on behalf of the ordinary citizens who associated 
the dramatic decline in living standards with the reform process and the liberalization 
of political and economic life. The voters in these countries had not had any previous  
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democratic experience and many of them could not see any other opportunity to get 
over the crisis but going back to the status quo before the crisis. This has fueled the 
nostalgic preferences of voters. Interestingly, the first pluralist parliamentary elections 
in the CIS Member States took place before the mandates of their first post-Soviet 
presidents elected in a relatively democratic way around 1990 expired. Hence the first 
electoral democratic cycle in the CIS was won first of all by non-doctrine parties that 
represented at that time the circles of the presidents and executives of those countries. 
The second category of parties that enjoyed a relatively massive vote were the ones of 
communist or crypto-communist origin and which were contesting the need for 
reforms in principle. At last, the third category of parties supported by the voters was 
the one that represented the parties that were exploring nationalistic feelings. Those 
were the parties that formed as a result of the breaking up of People's Fronts and 
Interfronts. These three categories of parties had a relative success due to the fact that 
they were either backed by administrative resources of governments or were 
appealing to citizens' feelings. Thus, we have noticed in the CIS area three distinct 
categories of parties that promoted presidential authoritarianism, the comeback to 
communism and nationalism (Georgia and Azerbaidjan).  
 
Now in retrospect it is difficult to imagine that the voters would have been able to 
notice and embrace an alternative choice such as, for instance, the social democratic 
or the liberal one. All the more so that for the CIS countries there existed no offer 
from the outside to join the EU as it existed for the Baltics and the CEE. On the 
contrary, the CIS countries have had to face attempts by some influential circles in 
Russia that refused to accept the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Thus, an International 
of secessionist regions in the former Soviet republics was inspired and established to 
keep the latter within Russia's sphere of influence. The example of Belarus is 
representative in this sense. President Lukashenko has survived politically because he 
received the necessary support from the Russian political elite. Top figures of the 
Russian political elite (Cernomyrdin, Stroyiev, Seleznyiev) came especially to Mensk 
in November 1996 to put pressure on the Parliament and the Constitutional Court to 
stop the procedure of impeachment against Lukashenko. This was enough for 
Lukashenko to take over the political initiative and bring the political events in a 
suitable direction. Everyone knows what followed afterwards.  
 
However, it is curious to observe a certain correlation in the electoral behavior in 
these countries. In the 1993-1994 elections in Russia and Ukraine approximately 12 to 
13 percent voted for the communists, and when the Moldovan communists first 
participated in the local elections in 1995 they won 16 percent. In the second electoral 
cycle in 1996-1998, approximately 25 percent voted for the communists in Russia and 
Ukraine each, while in Moldova they received around 30 percent of votes. Obviously 
the electoral behavior of Moldovans until 1999 was not much different from the one 
of Russians and Ukrainians. Now the following problem emerges: why is it that in the 
third electoral cycle in 1999-2001 the Russian and Ukrainian communists received 
around 20 to 25 percent each, while the Moldovan ones as much as 50 percent? The 
difference between Russia and Ukraine on the one hand and Moldova on the other is 
that in the first electoral cycle in Russia and Ukraine no party affiliated to the 
presidents or including the presidents were created. To a certain extent this forced the 
Russian and Ukrainian presidents to opt for the introduction of presidential regimes, 
which thing happened, including through the use of military force and administrative 
resources, but also the support of the new economic elite seeking to avoid the  
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comeback to power of the revengeful communists. In the Republic of Moldova, on the 
contrary, even at the beginning of the first electoral cycle in 1994 the ruling political 
elite consolidated around the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova (DAPM) which 
later proved to be a clients' party. In the first stage the positive effects of such state of 
affairs showed up. The Constitution was adopted whereby a semi-presidential system 
to balance various political groups' interests was introduced. Later, though, two more 
reformist groupings that were gravitating around President Mircea Snegur and the 
Speaker Petru Lucinschi left the DAPM. Curiously the electoral options of the 
Moldovan voters in the first two electoral cycles were predictable and highly 
influenced by top political figures. Unfortunately, the attempt by the first Moldovan 
President Mircea Snegur to found a powerful party failed. The Party of Rebirth and 
Conciliation that he constituted faded gradually as he lost the presidential elections 
and with it the administrative resources to influence voters. The second Moldovan 
President did not want to become the leader of any party and avoided getting involved 
with any preferring that parties court him instead. But for parties to court him, 
President Lucinschi needed the power that president Yeltsin and Kuch'ma enjoyed, as 
well as other authoritarian presidents in the CIS area who managed to introduce 
presidential systems. Lucinschi's attempts to introduce a presidential system were 
opposed by almost all parliamentary factions and groupings but a small one. Of 
course, the president could have withdrawn his initiative but then this would have 
been interpreted as a defeat and therefore there really existed no compromise solution. 
On the other hand, the presidential regimes in the CIS have shown that 
presidentialism is not the best option. We are presently witnessing the deep crisis 
faced by Belarus and Ukraine. Russia succeeded to get out of the crisis after a period 
of instability of approximately 10 years. Yet, this happened not so much due to the 
stability of the political system as to the favorable international environment and the 
importance of this country, which will never be left by the West to go waste.  
 
In Moldova the deep political crisis happened when government was being associated 
by the voters with the center-right coalition. This crisis found a logical conclusion in 
the early elections within which only the communists managed to explain its causes in 
a manner suitable for them. They promised to solve people's many social problems, 
including by joining the Russia-Belarus Union where energy cost at least three times 
less than Moldova was paying at the time.  
 
The obvious conclusion is that the Moldovan political class has failed to put forward 
in due time an objective similar to the one proposed by the political elite in the CEE 
countries and the Baltics. It is true that Moldova was situated in a different area of 
interest and was experiencing a secessionist conflict within its borders. Thus the EU 
could not send Moldova any clear signals. For these reasons it is obvious that none of 
Moldova's first presidents had the ability to use the authority of their office to found 
or take over the leadership of a party whose message would have met the expectations 
of the majority of Moldovans. It was the communists who managed to produce this 
message promising eastward orientation and exploiting to maximum people's 
nostalgia for a relatively stable past. It was these things that helped communists win 
the 2001 elections.  
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At present, the Communist Party is pressured from outside to modernize and is thus 
sliding more towards social democracy. In fact, this is what has happened in most 
CEE countries. It is difficult to foresee how social democratic the communists will 
turn. They hold the parliamentary majority and could do many useful things. In this 
sense it is only encouraging that the communists have been speaking lately of 
Moldova's joining the EU. This is a profitable business to change the communist 
illusions for a prospect of actual wealth, even though a distant one, within the EU, 
which as we have already shown is chiefly of social democratic nature. Most of those 
who vote for communists are interested little in ideology. Hence they could keep 
voting for communists even if these transact illusions for a certain degree of realism. 
According to appearances, the problem the communists have is not so much in their 
relations with the voters as it is within the party and in their capacity to defeat the 
reflexes of the dogmatic members inside the party. In exchange, an eventual 
modernization would save the communist elite the need to demonstrate that they "are 
not horned", as President Voronin and the leader of the Communist Faction Victor 
Stepaniuc use to say.  
 
These issues could be discussed within the Permanent Round Table supported by the 
Council of Europe. Certainly, this could happen only if the communists give up their 
arrogance of all-mighty, and the opposition gets rid of the illusion that it can rival the 
communists while it is fragmented, all the more so that the international political 
environment is changing so quickly that the Moldovan political class can hardly keep 
pace with it. Certainly very much depends on Russia's position, which has extensive 
influence over the leaders in Chisinau but also heavy weight in the solution of the 
Transdnistrian conflict.  
 
As for the fate of the four social democratic parties that received in the last 
parliamentary elections about 20 percent of votes, it is to be seen if they are able to 
join their efforts together.  
 29
The Federalization of the Republic of Moldova: Opportunities and Risks 
Igor Botan, December 9, 2002  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Since federalization has been recently proposed as a solution to the separatist conflict 
in the Republic of Moldova, debates have spurred on which type of state is more 
viable in such cases, the unitary or the federal one formed of territorial units that 
enjoy a certain degree of autonomy? The proponents of federalism have outlined the 
following opportunity such a project offers: a federation is founded on state efficiency 
plus political freedom.  
 
According to federalists, the federal state provides optimum conditions for the 
balancing of various territorial, national, social, economic, financial, political and 
other interests.  
 
Also, it is largely believed that federalism can result in a more efficient activity of the 
state administration. Hence, under the pressure from local governments the central 
administration works more efficiently, while the former are more concerned with 
working out solutions based on their local resources. Yet, it is believed that the 
founding principles of unitary and federal states are converging. In this sense the 
efficient and peaceful functioning of certain states that are not de jure federations, 
such as Italy and Spain, are considered along federal states. The Spanish Constitution 
adopted in 1978 enshrines the democratic standards by which the country is to abide, 
but avoids making any reference to "federalism", and refers instead to the "state of 
autonomies", although constitutional law experts consider that Spain is a federation de 
facto. Considering this, it is yet to be determined which formula, the federalist or the 
regionalist one can be more efficient in fighting secessionist movements through 
centripetal trends. The thing is that secessionist movements exist not only in unitary 
or federal states with a medium to low level of development, but even in rich federal 
states, such as Canada and Australia. Hence federalization is not a panacea against 
separatism, and the attempt to solve a separatist conflict through federalization raises 
a number of issues. The basic one is concerned with finding the optimum balance of 
interests in a state. In different countries federalism is applied depending on local 
peculiarities. Therefore it is important to establish the principles for constituting stable 
federations.  
 
II. Basic factors characterising federations 
 
There are five factors, which need to be examined. 
  
1. The modality of establishing federations. According to this factor, federations 
are unional and decentralized. An example of such federation is the United 
States of America, which for security and economic reasons joined into a 
federation. Other federations constituted as a result of the decentralization of 
unitary states are India, Russia and Canada. Such federation can be constituted 
in the result of an agreement with a region. The draft statute proposed by the 
OSCE for Moldova falls into this category.  
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2. Separation of vertical powers. According to this factor, federations are 
classified according to the delegation of powers by the subjects of the center, 
or, on the contrary, the decentralization of power that comes from central 
authorities. It is obvious that the method of delimitating powers is directly 
dependent on the method of constitution examined above. This factor is one of 
discord between Chisinau and Tiraspol. For these reasons the OSCE draft is 
favorable to Chisinau.  
 
 
It is significant that in modern federations the legal norms working at the 
central level have superiority over the local norms when these relate to areas 
subject to federal regulation. As a rule, this is stipulated in constitutions.  
 
The settlement of disputes between the federal center and the federal subjects 
is the task of Constitutional Courts. For example, in Spain the Constitutional 
Court has resolved almost 600 of disputes between central and local 
authorities over 10 years since the adoption of the Constitution. Most often 
these problems arouse in areas related to economy, agriculture, and public 
works. Calls for constitutional justice have been made both by the central 
authorities and the regional ones. Still, almost 2/3 of cases brought to 
constitutional justice has belonged to regional authorities. Also in Spain, apart 
from the methods of solving conflicts between central and local authorities 
through the Constitutional Court, there exists the possibility to solve conflicts 
through the Court of Accounts. As a rule, the Court of Accounts has powers of 
control over regional budgets. In the OSCE draft agreement references to the 
role of the Constitutional Court in settling disputes are missing.  
 
3. The harmonization of elements of coordination and subordination between the 
federal center and the federal subjects. According to this factor, federations are 
classified as centralized and non-centralized. In the case of centralized 
federations obvious priority is given to national interests over the ones of 
federal subjects. In India, for example, the Parliament has the right to adopt 
laws that fall within the competence of the subjects if these are voted with 2/3 
of votes. The non-centralized federalism is achieved based on agreements that 
stipulate expressly the competencies of the federal center and the ones of the 
federal subjects. Examples are the USA and Canada. This principle of 
delimitating between national and territorial interests is also known as 
subsidiarity.  
 
In any case, of exclusive central administration competence are such areas as 
federal legislation, foreign policy, defense, the customs and tariffs regime, 
public finances, the financial-banking system, national transport and 
communications, as well as the framework for basic human rights.  
 
One of the most important problems of federations refer to the constitution of 
two-chamber parliaments, especially of superior chambers based on the equal 
representation of federal subjects (Switzerland), or on the proportional 
representation with the number of inhabitants (Austria, Germany). In the 
superior chamber of the German parliament each subject is represented by at 
least three deputies, subjects that have more than 2 million inhabitants are  
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represented by four deputies, and subjects with more than 5 million by five 
deputies. Members of the superior chamber are Prime ministers and ministers 
of Lander. According to the German Constitution, almost half of federal laws 
need to be approved by the superior chamber.  
 
Within the competence of local authorities usually fall problems of self-
administration, such as culture, education, local budgets, health assistance, 
public order. Yet, things are not as simple because the central authorities retain 
a number of leverages of influence over their subjects. In Germany, for 
example, the federal authorities have the right to adopt laws related to the local 
public administration. The Spanish Constitution provides for a series of areas 
of competence that can be offered to autonomies. As a consequence, one 
cannot talk of a random approach; all competencies granted to autonomies are 
negotiated between the central power and the local one and are included in an 
agreement, which is to be mutually observed. Such an agreement between 
central and regional authorities exists in Italy too, although Italy is not a de 
jure federation, and it relates to the rights of each region. By all appearance 
the OSCE draft provides for the constitution in the Republic of Moldova of a 
non-centralized federation.  
 
4. The distribution and exercise of powers. From this perspective federations are 
classified as binary and cooperative. Chronologically, federalism has evolved 
from the binary system whereby the distinction between the powers of the 
center and regions is very clear to the cooperative one. In cooperative 
federations powers are blurring to allow the optimum efficient solution for 
current problems. Cooperative federations are the USA, Germany and Austria.  
It is worth mentioning that the subjects of current federations are not 
sovereign. In none of the European Constitutions are the rights of federal 
subjects provided for. In the constitutions of Switzerland and Spain it is 
expressly stipulated that territorial units do not have the right to enter into 
alliances or conclude political treaties with each other without the 
authorization of central governments. Thus, federal subjects are denied the 
right to conduct foreign affairs independently. In Switzerland the cantons last 
signed international treaties on their behalf in the 1940s. The German Lander 
can sign international treaties only in such areas as culture, education and 
science. Moreover, to enter this kind of treaties they need the approval of the 
central government, which decides whether such treaties touch upon the 
German foreign policy interests or not.  
 
Since federations are self-organized systems, they might devise heterogeneous 
development. To balance such trends many of the extant federations entail 
mechanisms of homogenization providing for convergence schemes for less 
developed regions (Germany and Russia). In this sense an eventual federation 
in Moldova should provide for a mechanism of redistribution of incomes from 
Transitria to Gagauzia. The industrial potential of Transitira is accidental, 
including due to the indirect contribution of Gagauzia which was imposed an 
agricultural specialization.  
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Still, the major role in regulating relations between the center and the federal 
subjects belongs to the financial-fiscal policies, and not the restraint of 
competencies.  
 
Germany is a renowned innovator in the field of financial relations in a 
federation. The German model rests on the mechanism of financial autonomy. 
The federation and its subjects are independent financially in that they are to 
fund independently the activities that fall within their constitutional 
competence. It is exactly for this reason that the distribution of tax returns 
between the Federation and the subjects is done based on their powers in order 
to ensure the functioning of central and regional structures. The income and 
corporate tax returns are distributed equally between the center and the 
subjects, and the VAT due to the subjects is established by law. Also, the 
German Constitution provides for the redistribution of incomes to balance the 
incomes of citizens from various Lander. The central government offers 
subsidies to "poor Lander", so that the income per capita in all Lander be 
equivalent to at least 95% of the country average. It is believed that this way 
the German cooperative federalism is distinct from the American federalism 
where citizens vote "with their feet" migrating to states where the living 
standards and the prospects for economic development are higher. The 
American system has advantages too. It is believed to be the duty of federal 
authorities to make sure the economic situation and the population's incomes 
are high enough for the population not to migrate. Otherwise states risk 
suffering substantial losses due to the fact that the money that they get from 
the federal budget is proportionate with their number of inhabitants.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the rights of federal subjects are not limited to 
financial autonomy. According to the provisions of a number of federal 
constitutions the subjects can have their own constitutional and legal regimes. 
The political reform in Belgium directed towards federalization started with 
the introduction of constitutional provisions related to the establishment of 
regional parliaments and governments in the Walloon region, the Flemish 
region and the Brussels region.  
 
5. The way of functioning, the difference in the status of subjects, the internal 
organization of subjects. According to this factor, federations are classified as 
symmetric and asymmetric. Most stable federations are symmetric with few 
elements of asymmetry. This means that all federal subjects are equal, 
although small exceptions are made that are not related to their legal status 
(USA, Germany, Brazil). These differences are usually related to the factors 
that lay at the foundation of a federation, national or territorial and which are 
very important for the establishment of a federation. From this point of view, 
for instance, Russia is rather an asymmetric federation, being made up of 
republics, oblast', kray, autonomous entities etc. The republics have more 
rights than other subjects, which determines the latter to seek equal rights 
facing strong resistance from the republics. It is believed that asymmetric 
elements generate chaos. In Moldova it is not clear yet whether the type of 
federation that is being proposed is symmetric or asymmetric. Likewise, we do 
not know yet whether the parliament and other bodies of the federation will be  
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bodies of Moldova as a federal subject. The example of Yugoslavia has shown 
that the latter formula is extremely dangerous.  
 
Therefore in federal states the central powers have the right to introduce the 
emergency state in the autonomies when there is such a need, but as a rule 
central authorities avoid turning to such measures. Hence the importance of 
the structure of law-enforcing institutions.  
 
For example, according to the Swiss Constitution, the Swiss Confederation 
guarantees the territorial integrity of cantons as well as their sovereignty 
within the limits provided for by the Confederate Constitution, the 
constitutions of cantons, people's freedoms and rights. Where necessary the 
confederate authorities can introduce the state of emergency in cantons and 
can suspend the citizens' rights and the powers of canton authorities.  
 
We have already shown that there is no federation, which would provide for 
the rights of subjects to secede, and such cases are solved including by 
military means (for example, Western Australia in 1938, Russia in 1995). Still, 
many secessionist conflicts occur, as for instance Singapore seceded from 
Malaysia in 1965. Hence federations are not very different from unitary states. 
The basic principles are the same: common territory, a community of people 
who own the sovereignty, common power bodies at national level. To ensure 
the stability of federal systems it is necessary for the internal relations to be 
quite strong and for none of its constituent parts to have priority over others. 
The relations between the center and the subjects should be mutual. As soon as 
these principles are breached, federations collapse. The international 
experience has shown that for federations to be stable federal centers need to 
hold a series of exclusive powers and the capabilities necessary to ensure 
territorial, economic, political, and socio-cultural integrity.  
 
 
III. Risk and stability factors in a federation 
 
Talk about ethnic federalism and its efficiency has been more intense lately. Most 
federations are constituted according to the territorial criterion (USA, Germany, 
Australia) and the federal subjects have equal rights. This type of federations are 
usually more stable than the ones constituted by ethnic principles. In countries where 
federations are constituted by the ethnic criterion there are trends towards secession 
and the creation of autarchies. Therefore, a number of experts, especially Russian, 
have argued that the federations constituted on ethnic principles are not viable.  
 
1. Criteria of assessing the stability of federal states.  
 
These criteria can be classified as internal and external. The internal ones refer to the 
criteria based on which the territorial or ethnic federations have been founded, the role 
played by a certain ideology, the level of democracy, the perception by citizens of the 
federal choice.  
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The importance of such external factors as the geographical distance from the powers 
of the time, the experience of a unifying war against colonial power (followed by a 
long period of external security), rich natural resources, has been widely shown upon 
the constitution of the USA.  
 
If we were to determine a scale of stability of federations based on the above factors, 
as extremely stable, relatively unstable, and stable, the following classification would 
obtain:  
 
a. Extremely unstable. Federations constituted on ethnic and ideological criteria 
that collapsed - USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia;  
b. Relatively unstable. Federations in permanent crisis - Canada, Belgium, 
India, Nigeria, Russia;  
c. Relatively stable. Multi-ethnic states with elements of federalism, but which 
resolve their ethnic problems based on regionalist projects (Italy and Spain);  
d. Stable. Federations based on the territorial criterion and ethnically 
homogenous, such as Germany, or homogenous in terms of diversity, such as 
the USA. According to the degree of stability the ethnically homogenous 
unitary states such as France can be included in the same category.  
 
 
2. The case of the Republic of Moldova.  
 
Although the draft agreement on the federalization of Moldova is, in our view, one 
constituted according to requirements, it nonetheless includes a series of drawbacks, 
the most important of which is the fact that the number of federal subjects is not 
specified. This renders the situation difficult due to the fact that the Gagauz leaders 
demand that Gagauz Yeri becomes a federal subject with equal rights. This is one of 
the electoral promises of the newly elected Governor Gheorghe Tabunscik who had 
the support of the Communist Party of Moldova. There are no provisions whatsoever 
with regard to the institution of a constitutional body as it is often the case in existing 
federations. Instead, the role of such an institution is to be assumed by some state 
guarantors, a provision that the opposition parties have qualified as undermining the 
sovereignty and independence of Moldova. It is true that this provision is to be 
effective only during a transition period. Finally, most curious is the provision in 
Article 42 which claims the superiority of the federation agreement over the 
Moldovan Constitution.  
 
If we were to use the scale mentioned above and relate the factors known to be 
generating stability in a federation to the ones generating instability we would observe 
that the equation is not in favor of a federal Moldovan state; the subjects of an 
eventual Moldovan Federation will be constituted on ethnic principles; the ruling 
party, due to its position, is obliged to promote a policy of reintegration whose 
program objective is building a communist society; the reintegration is proposed to be 
effected following a separatist conflict whose causes are seen completely differently 
by both the elite and the citizens of the parties involved; the guarantor states have 
overt interests in the Transdnistrian region etc. Considering these factors, the 
proposed Moldovan federation will oscillate between one extremely unstable and one 
relatively unstable.  
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Still, because the federalist solution to the conflict is somehow imposed from outside, 
the guarantees for stability should be external too, but by states with a record of 
positive experience in building federations, as well as international organizations.  
 
As a matter of fact it is not even known if the leaders from Tiraspol will accept the 
draft proposed by the OSCE at all. They are advocating a contractual Moldovan 
federation, which is to be formed by equal subjects, based on the model of the USA 
when practically independent states joined together in a federation. According to 
them, for this to happen the Republic of Moldova needs first to recognize the 
independence of Transdnistria, and then the two absolutely equal subjects, as founders 
of the Moldovan State, would conclude the federation agreement. The federation is to 
presuppose that the sovereignty belongs to the federal subjects who will delegate 
rights to the federal center. Obviously, if something goes wrong, the subjects can 
withdraw their delegated powers at any time. It is exactly for this reason that the 
Tiraspol leaders fail to see any difference between a federation and a confederation. It 
is very unlikely that Moldova will approve of these proposals. Even if this were to 
happen, the quality of Transdnistria as a founding party of the federal Moldovan state 
would mean revolutionizing the Moldovan statehood.  
 
Still, it appears that the Moldovan leadership has rushed to accept the federalist draft 
and has failed to convince the guarantor states that Moldova would prefer the Spanish 
federal model. The example of Spain is of particular relevance for Moldova.  
 
In Spain, the majority community is the Castilian one. Along with the Castilians, the 
Spanish regions are populated by Catalans, Basks, Galisians etc. After Franco's death 
in 1975, the country made efforts to modernize and adopt a new constitution. A series 
of measures were taken in this sense. First, the Spaniards' main concern was to 
legitimate the new bodies of central power. A national referendum on the reform of 
the party system was held which allowed for the organization of free and fair 
elections. Then the new Constitution was adopted in 1978 within a national 
referendum. Only then did the process of decentralization and autonomization of 
territories start. The new Constitution enshrined democratic principles but eluded 
references to federalism preferring the term "the state of autonomies" in order to 
discourage separatism. Experts in constitutional law believe that the Spanish 
autonomies enjoy the rights of federal subjects.  
 
 
3. The eventual stages of federalization of the Republic of Moldova.  
 
If the secessionist conflict in Moldova is resolved through federalization, then the 
following stages are to be considered. First, the OSCE draft agreement is to be signed 
as a political document, then a new constitution and a new electoral law is to be 
adopted. Next, the draft of the new constitution is to be adopted within national 
referendum on both sides of Nistru River. This is to be followed by elections to the 
federal bodies, the adoption of federal legislation, and the adoption of subjects' 
constitutions and of legislation to harmonize the relations in areas of national and 
mutual interest. The next steps will be elections to the representatives bodies of the 
subjects, the monitoring by international institutions of democratic processes on both 
sides of Nistru River, the implementation of economic aid programs by the countries 
and institutions that advised us to accept the federalist solution. In this sense, the  
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President's initiative to create a Minister of Reintegration makes sense to the extent 
that the occupant of this position will be tackling the stages proposed here.  
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Metamorphoses 
December 16, 2002  
 
 
Republic of Moldova President, Vladimir Voronin is due to make an official visit to 
US at the invitation of US President George W. Bush on December 16-20. There are 
very high expectations attached to this visit. Firstly, it follows the Prague and 
Copenhagen Summits, where historic decisions with regard to NATO and EU 
extension were taken. Those two events would have a crucial impact on the political 
developments in the region for quite a long time. President Voronin's reaction to the 
events followed shortly afterwards. Namely, during the first session of the National 
Commission for European Integration of December 12, President Voronin stated that 
"European integration is an imminent process and Republic of Moldova could no 
longer avoid it". One may interpret the statement as follows: Republic of Moldova has 
done everything possible to avoid European integration, but now the external 
environment makes it impossible to fight the process any longer. Indeed, the ruling 
party opposed all pro-European projects undertaken by the previous Governments.  
 
Secondly, the official visit would follow another important event, OSCE Summit in 
Porto held on December 6-7, 2002. Republic of Moldova failed to convince European 
Forum to exercise some pressure on the Transdnistrian breakaway regime, in order to 
make it more flexible at the negotiation table. It was the first time Republic of 
Moldova openly asked for such tough measures. Moreover, on the eve of the OSCE 
Summit representatives of Russia, Ukraine and OSCE submitted a document for 
Chisinau and Tiraspol to sign stating that both countries undertake to establish a 
contractual federation. Tiraspol yielded to the mediators, whereas Chisinau refused to 
sign the document on the grounds that it is a trap. Clearly, contractual federation is 
just an intermediary, but very important stage for Transdnistria to gain its 
independence. Recent developments indicate that Chisinau can no longer count on 
Moscow's support in a fair settlement of the Transdnistrian problem. Russia has 
entered electoral campaign for the Duma elections, accordingly Russian political elite 
is rather concerned with exploiting "patriotic feelings" of their fellow countrymen, 
especially as the country leadership is blamed for yielding too often lately (to cite 
only NATO troops in Central Asia as well as NATO extension). Presidential elections 
are due in Russia after the parliamentary ones, consequently in the next two years 
Republic Moldova could not count on any change in Russia's attitude on the 
Transdnistrian conflict. It is obvious that even within OSCE, Russia's opinion is the 
one which counts, and unfortunately it's not in favor of Moldova. The fact that Russia 
got an extension for withdrawing its munitions from the East of the Republic of 
Moldova is viewed as a huge advantage for Transdnistrian administration, which in 
the last 12 years learned to exploit politically, economically and financially the fact 
that Russian army and munitions are stationed on its territory. There is no doubt that 
the same story would be perpetrated in the future. Only this time it would be 
amplified by elections in Russia and by the myth of Transdnistria being the last 
Russia's redoubt at the border of Balkans. It is another story whether anybody needs 
this redoubt.  
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Given the above said, Republic of Moldova's only hope left is US and EU, despite the 
fact that incumbent governing previously opposed internationalizing the 
Transdnistrian conflict. One of the merits of the President Voronin is that he managed 
to surmount his own stereotypes about "American imperialism" and those of his 
fellow party members and "accepted to talk" to US President as well as to address EU 
leaders asking for their assistance in settling Transdnistrian crisis. Given the fact that 
Transdnistrian conflict settlement is one of the major objectives of the ruling party, 
the results of the US official visit are of special importance. It is expected that 
Chisinau could count utmost on US support in establishing a federation in the 
Republic of Moldova as a result of the power decentralization. In this case, 
Transdnistria would become a subject of federation, without its sovereignty or right to 
secession being recognized.  
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Referendum on joining EU 
December 23, 2002  
 
 
Vladimir Voronin's visit to Washington and his appeal to heads of EU states to 
support Republic of Moldova's efforts to join EU are undoubtedly the most significant 
events of the 2002 political year. Both of them may be regarded as follow-ups to the 
Prague and Copenhagen Summits, where major decisions with regard to NATO and 
EU extension were adopted. Under those circumstances Moldova becomes a 
neighborhood country to both structures.  
 
President Voronin visit to Washington on December 17-20 might prove very handy in 
settling problems that might facilitate joining EU. In this respect, the joint statement 
of Presidents Bush and Voronin refers specifically to the US support in settling 
Transdnistrian conflict, assistance in foreign debts settlement, and economic recovery 
of the Republic of Moldova. Indeed Republic of Moldova could count on US support 
if it continues economic reforms and observes democratic standards.  
 
As for EU integration, this is a long-term desideratum. Voronin's message to 
European officials reads "the idea of EU integration is a unifying and mobilizing 
factor for the country". The truth is that EU integration is a mobilizing factor only for 
the citizens who voted for opposition parties, and they account for 47% of the 
electorate, according to the last election results. In the very same election the unifying 
idea for 50% of the voters was joining Russia-Belarus Union and the champion of this 
ideal was the Communist Party headed by Vladimir Voronin. Several polls conducted 
in 2002 indicate that the number of people supporting EU integration equals the 
number of people supporting integration with Community of Independent States 
(CIS). Consequently it would take considerable efforts to consolidate the society 
around the ideal of European integration. Indeed, President Vladimir Voronin has the 
power to influence and convince the party electorate that EU integration opens large 
perspectives for the Republic of Moldova normal development. However, it would be 
much more difficult to convince the opposition that authorities are sincere in 
promoting EU integration. Opposition does not indulge itself in being naive.  
 
One may say President's message on EU integration was intended rather for the 
abroad audience. On the other hand, opposition believes there is an authoritarian 
regime in the country, and that is exactly why they appealed to Council of Europe to 
closely monitor the country so as to prevent any "slippage from democratic norms". 
And most notably, the party headed by the President of the country hasn't been 
reformed yet, continuing to operate under Marxist-Leninist principles. All the 
aforesaid point that there are far too many domestic problems and that Moldova is still 
too far from meeting the EU standards. An illustration of this is the document made 
public by TACIS country representative, Jo Declercq, which calmed down Moldovan 
authorities' integration fever right at the time Voronin was on official visit in 
Washington. The aforesaid document is three years old and outlines the conditions to 
be met by the country in order to initiate talks with EU. The document was probably 
developed at the time of Sturza Government, which made EU integration one of its 
top priorities. Now we realize that we have lost three years in vain and are still not in 
position to initiate negotiations.  
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Indeed, the President may invite pro-European parties for consultations within the 
framework of the Social Pact, which he initiated in view of elaborating the Strategy of 
EU integration. But it seems that the Communist Party and opposition compete in 
advocating for EU integration. Furthermore, even opposition parties contest among 
themselves who's the pioneer in launching EU integration idea. Given the aforesaid 
Christian-Democrats idea to initiate a referendum so as to consult the citizens seems 
timely and appropriate. The fact is that only a referendum might turn the idea of 
European integration from political speculations to a legal issue, as citizens stand for 
the sovereignty. Furthermore, once referendum is initiated both authorities and leaders 
of the ruling party would find it difficult to hamper it or to avoid electioneering in 
favor of European integration. Still if they were to do so, they would have been 
accused of insincerity and would have put the President in a quite difficult position, as 
he was the one to issue in September a Decree on establishing a National Commission 
for European Integration. On the other hand, electioneering for integration would not 
exactly help Communists to save their face, due to the huge contrast between their 
political program and EU integration principles. The referendum would force the 
Communist party to initiate reforms within the party and to adjust its political 
program to the EU requirements.  
 
This undertaking is an intelligent and tiresome effort. It is a challenge both for the 
ruling party as well as for the opposition parties. The only solution for the ruling party 
is to reform itself prior to the referendum, which won't be easy to achieve due to the 
shortage of time. Furthermore this undertaking might endanger the Communist party 
unity.  
 
The opposition parties are also not in the best situation. Although they share similar 
values Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party and the rest of opposition parties are in 
the state of "cold war". Several years ago, during its "clean hands" campaign 
Christian-Democrats accused their former coalition partners of corruption, fact that 
resulted in the ousting of the reformist Ion Sturza Government. The court didn't find 
enough evidence to support Christian-Democrats' allegations, rather those allegations 
ruined small but promising parties.  
 
The differences between Christian-Democrats and other opposition parties have 
surfaced this year during the protest rallies initiated by the Christian-Democrats in the 
form of "meetings with voters". On these grounds, Christian-Democrats were accused 
that they "monopolized the microphone" on the Great National Assembly square, 
where the protest rallies were staged. Once Christian-Democrats launched the idea of 
a referendum on EU integration, the rest of opposition parties have no excuses to 
refrain from supporting the initiative. They were the ones to launch the idea of EU 
integration in 2000 when 20 out of the 25 political parties signed a memorandum in 
this respect. This year also, political parties participants to the Permanent Round 
Table reiterated the same idea of signing a memorandum on EU integration, however 
they lacked the insight to go for a referendum, as did Christian-Democrats.  
 
The way the initiative group was established and the appeals to other parties to join 
the signature collection process (500,000 signatures instead of 200,000), are 
illustrative of the fact Christian-Democrats undertook the role of pro-European 
integration force. There is no doubt that Christian-Democrats could collect the 
200,000 signatures on their own, without the support of other political parties. The  
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parties adhering the initiative would have to acknowledge Christian-Democrats 
superiority, whereas the parties choosing to ignore it, would be accused of not being 
able to overcome their envy, even for the sake of such an undertaking of strategic 
importance for the Republic of Moldova.  
 
Authorities and Communist leaders showed no signs of enthusiasm at the Christian-
Democrats' initiative, labeling it as useless due to the fact that there is a consensus on 
European integration among political parties. However, the truth is that a would-be 
referendum would narrow Communists' maneuvering power, and would cut the 
possibility of withdrawing, namely abandoning the idea of EU integration, as they 
already did with the Russia-Belarus union. One may not rule out the aforesaid 
scenario. For instance, under the Basic Treaty signed by Republic of Moldova and 
Russian Federation, the latter is a guarantor country to the settlement of the 
Transdnistrian conflict. If Transdnistrian gains an equal status to that of the Republic 
of Moldova as a result of the federalization, and if it chooses to join CIS rather than 
EU, than Russia would probably have to ensure this. Further, if on the eve of elections 
Republic of Moldova would be increasingly pressured by Russia to pay its debts for 
natural gas supplies, or would have to raise the price on it, there are great chances 
Communist authorities would revise their pro-European strategy in favor of Eurasia 
Union. For these reasons, only a referendum might clarify Republic of Moldova's EU 
integration intentions.  
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Overview of year 2002 
December 30, 2002  
 
 
It seems the most important events of the 2002 were: protest rallies at the beginning 
of the year; OSCE draft on the federalization of the Republic of Moldova; October 
CIS Summit; Presidential Decree on establishing a National Commission for 
European Integration; Christian-Democrats initiative to conduct a referendum on 
joining EU and NATO; and President Voronin's official visit to Washington.  
 
The aforesaid events are important, as they have marked the beginning of important 
stages in the political process having a major impact on the Republic of Moldova. 
Let's say protest rallies staged by the Christian-Democrats at the beginning of the year 
ended with the adoption of PACE Resolution and close monitoring of political 
developments in the Republic of Moldova by the Council of Europe. The fact that 
Republic of Moldova is due to take over the presidency of the Council of Europe 
Ministerial Council at the time Communists are in power, seems an advantage. For 
one thing, this may serve, as a guarantee that there would be no "anti-democratic 
slide" within the country at least for the time period Republic of Moldova would hold 
the presidency.  
 
OSCE draft on the Republic of Moldova federalization marked the negotiation 
process on settling Transdnistrian conflict and would have serious repercussions. The 
fact is that, political forces in the Republic of Moldova insisted on the 
internationalization of the Transdnistrian conflict settlement process, but they never 
managed to produce a proposal on settling the conflict convenient for the Republic of 
Moldova. Not to say that the international machinery is very slow in examining issues 
concerning such small and exotic countries like ours. Under those circumstances the 
country leadership preferred to accept the federalization draft presented by OSCE. It 
was only on the eve of the OSCE Summit in Porto that Moldovan leadership realized 
that is has fallen into the trap. Russia, Ukraine, OSCE and Transdnistria made an 
attempt to force Republic of Moldova to sign a statement of intentions on the 
establishment of a "contractual federation". Moldovan representative refrained from 
signing, as he understood that the "contractual federation" was the intermediary, but 
decisive step towards Transdnistria's independence. Considering the aforesaid one 
may conclude that there are no chances for Republic of Moldova to avoid 
federalization. The only thing left is to gain the acceptance of federalization through 
decentralization, i.e. a federation is to be established and within its framework 
Republic of Moldova would grant extensive prerogatives to Transdnistria, however 
without recognizing its sovereignty and right to cession. The only way to achieve the 
aforesaid is by gaining the support of US, the only superpower able to overcome any 
impediments. Republic of Moldova would have to undergo a long and tiresome 
reorganization of the state power under a severe economic crisis. This reorganization 
would take quite a long time and all this time the major mediators - Russia and 
Ukraine would take Tiraspol side. Considering those circumstances President Voronin 
was right to ask for US and EU support, despite the fact he used to oppose such an 
interference. This however, might jeopardize the unity of the ruling party. 
Consequently, Vladimir Voronin would have to navigate under extremely difficult 
conditions, especially as in order to gain EU and US support he would have to accept 
some inner reforms.  
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The joint statement of Presidents Bush and Voronin signed during Washington visit 
contains extremely important provisions regarding reforms, investments, etc. It also 
stipulates the need to further ensure the freedom of press and free and fair elections. 
The latter is probably a polite warning made by US authorities once the experience of 
elections in Gagauz-Yeri and situation of mass media in Moldova came to their 
knowledge.  
 
The metamorphoses in President Voronin's political orientation could have been 
predicted earlier on. It sees Moldovan authorities realized long time ago they have 
nothing more to expect from Community of Independent States (CIS). CIS member 
countries pursue quite different interests and Russia does not possess enough 
economic and financial resources to keep those countries within its exclusive field of 
interest. For instance, Ukrainian President, Leonid Kucima, stated recently there was 
no reason for his country to enter Eurasia Union, unless Russia equals the prices it 
charges from members states to the inner ones.  
 
From this perspective, Moldovan authorities' declarations that EU integration did no 
contradict CIS membership are rather precaution measures aimed at avoiding 
confrontation with Russia. Both political leaders and analysts agree that CIS is an 
inoperative structure and the only thing it is capable of is cutting its enormous 
personnel. Needless to say, President Voronin signed the Decree on the establishment 
of a National Commission for European Integration right before the CIS Summit in 
Chisinau. The nine years passed since Copenhagen Summit, which adopted the 
standards and criteria for EU extension, have shown political and economic progress 
that could be achieved by candidate countries. Even the incumbent ruling party in 
Moldova cannot deny this fact.  
 
And finally, Christian-Democrats initiative to consult the population on whether to 
join EU via a national referendum might prove to have a great impact as well. This is 
a very positive initiative although at the first glance one may say there is nothing 
special about it, as long as practically all political parties are in favor of European 
integration. The positive thing about it is that only a referendum might turn the idea of 
European integration from political speculations to a legal issue decided by citizens of 
the country, even if it is only a consultative referendum. Let's not forget that political 
leaders rapidly change their opinions readjusting them to the conjuncture.  
 
However under the internal and external pressure the ruling party would have to face 
its reformation. The issue was raised during the May Party Plenary Session, however 
there was no follow-up. That is why, there is an impression of a gap between the 
President Voronin message and the principles stipulated in the party official 
documents. Only recently the Communist Party ideologists started a debated with 
social-democratic parties. Communist Party ideologists accused Moldovan social-
democrats of discrediting the idea and claimed that they were the real social-
democrats, although they had no intention to change the party name, which is so 
popular among the impoverished population of the country (accounting for 80%).  
 
Given the aforesaid one may conclude that the most important events of 2003 would 
most likely be related to: withdrawal of Russian munitions from Transdnistria and 
negotiations on federalization of the Republic of Moldova; local elections scheduled 
for May; consultative referendum on joining NATO and EU; elaboration and  
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enforcement of the Poverty Reduction Strategy under the supervision of the WB and 
IMF; elaboration of the Strategy on European Integration; and reforming ruling party. 
All of the said events are very complex ones and because of this the relationships 
between the ruling party and opposition would be of crucial importance. In 2002 those 
relationships generated too many political conflicts.  
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